




When Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes offered Norman Krumholz the directorship of the Cleveland 
City Planning Department in 1969, Krumholz jumped in with hopes of getting the maximum effort 
toward the social justice that Stokes, the first black mayor of as large U.S. city, represented.  
These papers represent Krumholz’ first efforts. They reflect a series of initial forays engaging parts 
of the city hall bureaucracy, talking to the mayor’s constituents and testing the waters with city 
institutions like the newspapers, and other professional contacts like the Northeast Ohio Area 
Coordinating Agency (NOACA). These papers are short, generally written for spoken presentation 
rather than for publication. Some began as speeches to be given by Stokes. Some were at 
professional meetings or university speaking engagements, where he hoped to use the Cleveland 
experience to impact the practice of planning in the nation at large. 
The thread that runs through these papers is the encounter between social justice ideals and the real 
world of city hall and local institutions: the regional planning agency, the capital budgeting process 
in city hall, the transportation agencies in the city. They represent the first phase of Krumholz’ 
Cleveland career, from 1969 through 1975 – up to, but not including the Cleveland Policy Planning 
Report (1975). 
That report and its aftermath signaled a shift in Krumholz’ career and made a significant impact on 
the planning profession and the history of city government. The whole story is still unfolding, but it 
was well told by Krumholz himself. He published “The Cleveland Policy Planning Report” with 
Janice Cogger and John Linner (two co-authors of the plan itself) in the Journal of the American 
Institute of Planners in 1975; and “A Retrospective View of Equity Planning: Cleveland 1969-
1979” in that same Journal in 1982.  A full account appeared in Making Equity Planning Work, 
written with John Forester (Temple University Press, 1990) and there have been dozens, hundreds of 
formal and informal presentations since the 1970s during a long academic career as a leading 
professor at Cleveland State University’s College of Urban Affairs and in such public roles as 
President of the American Planning Association (1987) and of the American Institute of Certified 
Planners (1999).   
Here are ten unpublished papers presented during Krumholz’ period with the City Planning 
Commission during 1969-75. (They were prepared for oral presentation, and with no original copy 
available, we present them complete with hand-written marginal notes.)   
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  Norman Krumholz,  in one of his  first  local  speeches  after  arriving  in Cleveland  as planning 
director,  gives  local  notable  the  bad  news  of  decline  –  population,  share  of  the  region, 
manufacturing – everything except a modest increase in business services and office space. He 
saw  hope  for  growth  in  office  space  and  the  airport‐related  business  complex;  and  in 
universities and health  care  institutions; was  short on other answers: he urged  support  for 
federal  family assistance  legislation  that would help Cleveland  families; and a metropolitan 
land development agency to regulate and support local development region‐wide.  
 







Remarks by Norman Krumholz, Director 
Cleveland City Planning Commission 
to the City Club, August 21, 1970
ECONOMIC TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY
I must confess the Cleveland scene provides a surplus of potential topics 
for anyone who is asked to talk about this City, particularly anyone connected 
with City Hall. I originally decided on the topic "The Ghetto Must Go" which 
was announced as the title of my talk this afternoon. But, after some reflection, 
I concluded this would be like shooting fish in a barrel; surely everyone in 
this room would agree that the ghetto must go, and you might even be joined by 
certain councilmen and a local rotund lawyer or two. So I chucked the topic 
as being too obvious and I must apologize to any of you who came in the hope 
öf getting your teeth into that topic. I then considered talking about the 
planning and development initiatives available to local decision-makers in a 
situation where all the significant money is locked-up and out of reach in 
Washington; I rejected that as being too depressing. Then I thought of con­
trasting the peace and accommodation of my last job as Assistant Director of 
the Planning Department in Pittsburgh with the conflicts of my present assign­
ment and perhaps make some comments on the implications of this conflict so 
far as recruiting and holding trained personnel, but I rejected this because 
I didn't think anyone would believe it. So I've turned my attention to some 
long-term economic trends in the City of Cleveland in comparison with its 
metropolitan region and,in spite of the fact that others with a rather direct 
pipeline to the Oracle of Delphi will be addressing themselves to these and 
other issues, I'd like to analyze these economic trends, discuss what produced
2t’.em, and make some recommendations for local public policy. I hope in the 
process I don't demonstrate a new cure for insomnia, but I am encouraged in 
the view that ours is a serious group eager to consider serious issues.
The economic indices for which we have gathered trend data include:
a. Population Level and Composition
b. Retail Trade Employment and Retail Sales
c. Wholesale Trade Employment
d. Manufacturing Trade Employment
e. Employment in Mise. Business Services
f. Trends in Amounts of Office Space
Let's start at the top with population and work our way down to see where 
we are today, where we were yesterday and where we may be going tomorrow.
As you all may know, the U.S. Census has just reported that the popula­
tion of the City of Cleveland has dropped to 739,000 in 1970- I believe 
this to be an undercount of about 5% but in any event, it represents a decline 
that has been underway since 1950 when Cleveland's population reached an all- 
time high of 91^,000.
Table 1: Population - City of Cleveland - 1900-1970
1900 1910 1920 1930
381,768 560,663 796,81+1 900,1+29
19^0 1950 i960 1910
878,336 91^,808 876,050 739,000
Although it is probably1 not as generally veil-known, it is not surprising, 
given the vast improvements in transportation and access, that the City's popu­
lation as a proportion of its surrounding region has been declining for a far 
longer period —  in fact, this decline or shift has been taking place since 
1 9 1 0 .
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Table 2: Cleveland's Population as a Proportion
of its Region - 1900-1970
1900 1910 1920 1930
82.8 81*. 9 82.0 72.1*
191*0 1950 i960 1970
69.3 62.1* 1*6.0 36.2
In 1910, Clsrd-and had about 85# of the total regional population. In 1950, 
vhen the city had its largest population in history, its share had declined to 
62%. Today, that share is 36$. A declining population may be seen as an oppor­
tunity to reduce densities and Improve the quality of life - but other factors 
must be considered.
While the level of population has been changing, so too has its composition. 
Trends suggest an increasingly dependent population residing in the City.
Since 19^0, population in the working ages (15-610 has gone from 75^ of 
total population to less than 60%. At the same time, the young and the elderly 
have grown from 23% to over k0%. Not only are broadened public services needed 
by the young and old, but fewer workers are now supporting the City population. 
This is confirmed by the trend in City population per employed resident —  from 
2.1* in 1950 to 2.7 in 1965.
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labié 3: Population in Selected Age Groups. City of Cleveland, 1940-1965
As Percent of Total Population




19.9 22.7 28.9 30.1 
74.7 69.5 61.2 59-9 
5.4 7.8 9.9 10.0
Table 4: Population Per Employed Person, City of Cleveland, 1950-65
1950 I960 1965
2.4 2.6 2.7
Between 1950 and 1965, the actual number of families in Cleveland declined 
from over 233,000 to less than 200,000. By our best estimates, almost 25$ of 
these families were faced with annual incomes of less than $4,000 and this poor 
population as a proportion of the total is showing remarkable resistance to 
change. These families are untouched by increases in the GNP because they are 
not in the labor market or are desperately underemployed.
So much for people. What has happened to retail trade employment and retail 
sales?
As the population has shifted outward, it is not surprising that neighborhood 
retail trade has gone along with it. As a result, dollar volumes in retail trade 
and retail trade employment in the City have shrunk. In 1948 (at the height of 
the population curve) there were over 67,000 retail employees in Cleveland, and 
the City had 8l# of all retail employment in the region. By 1967, the actual 
number of employees was 46,000 and the City was down to 44# of the total regional 
retail employment. In just 19 years, in other words, the City lost 21,000 retail 
employees, 37# of the regional retail employment.
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Table 5: Cleveland’s Retail Employment
As a Pro-portion of its Region and Actual
Humber of :Employeesi - 1929-1987
1222 1939 191*8 122i 1963 M L
Proportion 87.7 83.1* 80.6 73.5 1*9-7 1*1*. 3
Actual Employees **6 ,1*97 50,198 67,551 63,225 1*6,127 1*6,035
Trends in dollar volume of retail trade in the Ç^ .tÿ Abdicate an even more 
radical shift outward. From 1958 to 1967, retail dollar volume was slipping 
even faster than retail trade employment. And this decline took place during 
a period when retail sales in the region were expanding dramatically. In terms 
of percentage, Cleveland had 60$ of the total retail sales volume of the region 
in 1958; by 1967 it was down to 39$ • Actual dollar volume between 1958 and 
1967 dropped $87 million in the City while volume in the same 9 years in the 
region went up over $1 billion.
Table 6: Cleveland Retail Sales in Dollar Volume
aiKt as a Percentof SMSA - 1958, 1963. 19&7
(in Billions of Dollars)
1958 1963 1967
$ Volume Percent $ Volume Percent $ Volume Percent
Cleveland $ 1,383 60$ $ 1,250 1*7$ $ 1,296 39$
SMSA $ 2,290 $ 2,672 $ 3,315
Let us turn to wholesaling and take a look at what has been happening in this 
sector.
Almost from the day of its founding, Cleveland had been an important town for 
wholesaling activities. Its position at the mouth of a great river emptying into
a great lake meant that goods could he floated here from various directions ; 
here to he weighed, inspected or purchased or shifted to rail or wagon for 
further travel inland.
So dominant has Cleveland been in this type of activity that even as late 
as 195** over 93# of all wholesaling jobs in the metropolitan region were located 
in the City. But between 195** and 1963, the City's share of wholesaling jobs 
declined by 20#. Between 1963 and 1967 another 8# drop wag recorded.
Table 7: Cleveland's Wholesale Employment as a Proportion of its
Region and Actual Number Employees - 1929-196?
^  ^
1929 1939 19**8 195** 1963 196?
Proportion 97.1 97.9 96.k 93.5 73.5 65. **
Actual Employees 2kt9k6 23,539 36,8*11 39,650 33,226 32,560
The forces which lie behind this shift can be traced in great part to 
transportation changes. The shift in the movement of goods from rail to truck 
operating on high-speed regional highway networks has freed wholesalers from the 
need to be at rail terminals and has weakened the advantages of being close to 
a rail junction. So long as wholesalers relied principally on the rail lines 
in Cleveland, the fact that the point of convergence of different lines was with­
in the city acted as an attractive force. Once the truck began to be extensively 
used, however, the attraction of the City of Cleveland as the preferred distri­
bution point for wholesalers was weakened.
Although the decline in wholesaling has been relatively recent, Cleveland has 
been declining in importance as a manufacturing center relative to its region 
since 1929- Let me make clear at once that Cleveland's position in manufacturing
7far stronger than 10 other similar cities -we analyzed, hut, its share of 
manufacturing production workers has dropped from 09% in 1929 to 6o% in 1963.
«
Table fl; Cleveland Manufacturing Employment 
as a Proportion of its Region - 1929-1963
1929 1939 19^9 195 U 1963
Proportion 89.1 86.3 83.0 69.5 60.0
To understand the forces which determine industrial locations in Cleveland 
a century or two ago, one has to return to the problems of transportation. When 
Cleveland was in its earliest development stage, the mills lay inside the City 
for the City sat on the natural transportation routes and the City also 
typically provided much of the market and almost all of the labor which the 
factories employed.
As time went on, rail and truck offered manufacturing plants more latitude 
in choice of sites while the manufacturing structures became obsolete in terms 
of •ccorial processing and technological developments. This technological obso­
lescence was accelerated by the development of the assembly line. As a result 
of those changes, the old mill multi-story structure became inappropriate,
Paliei-loading and the use of the fork-lift truck, for example, were difficult in 
multi-story structures. The preferred type of structure became the one story 
building on large sites with the easy possibility of expansion in any direction.
if a manufacturer in Cleveland (or any city) wanted to expand his plant, 
his job became exceedingly difficult as time passed. Zoning regulations might 
limit his expansion or might classify him as a non-conforming user, unable to 
expand. If that was no problem, he would still have to deal with the owners of 
dozens of small parcels , one or two of whom might refuse to sell or attempt to
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gouge an impossible price and wreck the entire project. Moreover, once the 
site was acquired, demolition costs would run up costs substantially. This 
is precisely why the assembly of central city land is often so expensive, and 
so difficult.
So much for down-trends. We come now to a few trends which can be classi­
fied as optimistic and hopeful: employment in the "services" sector of the
onomy, and the construction of office space, both of which are related to 
downtown development, and the rapid growth of institutions which are more 
randomly located in the City.
Employment in business services which include advertising, communications 
and business consultants is up in Cleveland from 7,000 jobs in 195^ to 15,000 
in 1967, although the City accounts for a smaller proportion of the region even 
in this sector.
Table 9: Cleveland Mise. Business Services ^Employment as a
Proportion of its Region - and Actual Number Employees
195^-1967
195^ 1958 1963 1967
Pr •’Port i on 93 91 83 77
Actual Employees 7,032 9,839 11,21+5 1^ ,755
*Advertising, Communications, Bus. Consultants
Although we do not yet have the breakdowns for the important fields of Finance, 
Insurance and Real Estate, I am sure these sectors will show Cleveland in a strong 
position, probably being strengthened over time.
Similarly, the amount of occupied office space in the Central Business 
District (CBD) is up. By our best estimates the amount of office space in the 
CBD was about 6,500,000 sq. feet in April, 1950. Today, the square footage 
occupied or now being leased totals 10,287,000 square feet .not including space 
used by government offices or Bond Court and the Cleveland Trust Tower. It 
seems clear that the CBD is firmly maintaining its viability as an office 
center. Why?
From the earliest beginnings, office functions have sought out central city 
locations in most cities, and Cleveland is no exception. The reasons for this 
affinity are not altogether clear, but it appears as if information, negotiation, 
and the face-to-face kinds of communication which are essential to executive 
personnel provides the motivation. Then, too, an important reason for the con­
centration of office activities in downtown locations is the insensitivity of 
many office activities to the cost of space. Land costs in downtown areas are 
often higher than they are anywhere else in the region, but the cost of land 
v. he cost of construction are incidental to the need of office headquarters 
for prestige and proximity to one another.
In the last three years, new office construction has made up about 25# of 
the total dollar volume of all new construction in Cleveland for a total of about 
$62 million dollars. These 3 years have been the best construction years in 
■."Loveland's history. In this area, again, the City shows great vitality and growth.
Similar growth is also clear in the institutional field where schools, uni­
versities, hospitals and government buildings have been growing users of land.
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Let me recapitulate : long-term trends confirm that the City is not only
losing total population, hut retaining in the process the more dependent 
population groups. At the same time, the City is becoming a less viable loca­
tion for all but a relatively few sectors of economic activity, with attendant 
loss in municipal revenues and resident incomes. The result is a failing base 
of support for municipal revenues in the face of increasing demands for services 
by City residents. The outward-moving trends are caused by age and obsolescence 
in the City's physical plant, in a certain hardening of the City's physical 
arteries, in technological changes over time, in improved family income and in 
vastly improved transportation, mobility and access. It is poor consolation to 
observe that the suburban areas of the region will fall heir to much the same 
problems in their season, but that is certainly indicated and there is nothing 
In view calculated to interrupt this cycle.
The relevant question for us at this point is: What does all this mean for
local public policy? Let me mate some proposals in this area which lack the 
sanction of Mayor, Council and Planning Commission. Indeed, I am not even confident 
my wife shares my views on these matters.
1. It appears definitely to be in the City's interest to strengthen 
the strong market demand that now exists for office space. The in­
creased use of air travel by business executives is already a fact 
of life and this increased mobility will probably be exploited by 
gathering executives at central locations for quick dispersal into 
the field. Then too, air transport in the future is likely to weaken 
the hold on manufacturing and wholesaling now held by truck and rail,
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just as rail transport loosened the hold of the barge and cart.
Hence, I would strongly suggest support for the proposed Air- 
Port-In-The-Lake —  so long as the project does not divert local 
funds from needed services and housing.
The airport concept is no longer a few landing strips connected 
to the city by an unbilical cord. As now conceived, the Airport 
proposal is a Hew Town on a giant scale and gives us an opportunity 
to build on an area equal to almost one-third of Cleveland's present 
land area the new housing, manufacturing and transportation facili­
ties we so badly need. Properly funded out of federal and state 
programs, and developed in accord with City plans and priorities, 
it could support and capitalize upon those sections of the economy 
for which a central city location remains optimum.
2. Since a great part of Cleveland's crisis is the result of a lack of
money to maintain or improve services in the face of a heavily obsolete 
plant and a population less and less able to pay for services, the 
City must continue to press the federal and state levels for broad 
family assistance payments to help people, for bloc grants directly 
to the cities to spend as directed by local priorities, and for 
generally broadened federal funding. Mayor Stokes has been extremely 
active in this regard with recent testimony in support of the Ashly 
Bill which proposes to vastly expand federal urban aid, on the Koch 
Bill which proposes a Transportation Trust Fund to be allocated to 
any form of transportation as determined by local priorities, and on
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the proposed Family Assistance Program. This thrust must not be 
left to the Mayor's leadership alone but be broadened to include 
all concerned segments of this community. In that regard, I think 
the Planning Commission is to be commended for its resolution on 
the Family Assistance Program and transmission of the staff 
analysis to H.E.W. Secretary Elliott Richardson.
The Mayor and the Planning Commission are supporting a series of 
amendments designed to improve the work incentive provisions of 
the Nixon Bill, to provide equitable and adequate basic allowances 
to those who cannot work and to accomplish this without serious 
drain on national resources. Successful passage of these amendments 
would result in an estimated additional $100 million annually in 
Federal payments to the poor of Cleveland and an added $50 million 
annually to the non-poor of Cleveland. This money will end up, in 
other words, in local cash registers. Are you listening, Growth 
Association?
This important legislation is now before the Senate Finance Committee. 
Passage of this bill, with necessary amendments, will require much 
more effort among concerned citizens that has been demonstrated to 
date. But an adequate bill will be an important first step toward 
resolution of same of our most serious urban problems.
In pressing for these and similar programs, the cities will become the 
greatest force for liberalized politics of any institution.
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3. This proposal addresses itself to the quality of the future 
environment. Since new development takes place for historic, 
technological and particularly for economic reasons without 
any real control except for easily subverted local zoning and 
sub-division regulations, I would recommend that a metropolitan 
land development agency be established to acquire, plan, and 
improve land in the entire région and that this agency be given 
territorial jurisdiction for Cleveland and its suburbs and 
surrounding undeveloped areas.
This public agency would develop its land in conformance with a 
long-range metropolitan growth plan. It would install »11 
street and utility improvements, retain all sites needed for 
parks, schools and other neighborhood facilities, and then sell 
off or lease without profit the remaining land to private developers 
who would agree to build in accordance with the metropolitan plan 
which would include a program to offer housing choices to the poor 
on a regional basis. Unless something like this iB done, the 
future environment will look pretty much like the present.
The most important advantage of such a system would be the public 
control over the strategic elements of urban growth. But it would 
also dampen land speculation, provide a constant flow of improved 
building sites to the housing market, provide land on a regional 
basis for persons displaced by public programs and make open
housing a reality.
1+. Since a strong market demand exists for institutional uses, the 
City should encourage the expansion of universities, hospitals, 
government "buildings, etc. At the same time, the City must end 
its reliance on the property tax since these are non-taxable uses. 
Failing in this, the City should insist that all institutional 
uses be placed on the tax duplicate with federal and state govern­
ments paying a full property tax. I would apply the same recom­
mendation to all public housing. Let it pay full property taxes 
to local governments via a federal subsidy. In so doing we may 
eliminate one of the most strident complaints about public housing.
You may say that in suggesting these new governmental devices, I have 
raised greater problems than I sought to solve. This could be, but I must 
console myself with the story of the grasshopper and the ant. The grasshopper 
dreads the winter months to come and the ant advises him to change himself into 
a cockroach. The grasshopper is delighted with the advice but asks how it 
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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING, PROBLEMS AND NEW DIRECTIONS
Norman Krumholz
Director, Cleveland City Planning Commission
- A paper prepared fo r  presentation at the AIP/DOT Conference in Cleveland -
November 16 and 17, 1970
In this country's urban and densely populated suburban areas, trans­
portation programs are in trouble and Cleveland is no exception. Mass 
transit suffers from declining ridership, revenues and service. Public out­
cries against the highway program have become so fam iliar that they can be 
summarized in a few phrases: unresponsiveness to the varied p r io r it ie s  o f
many c lien ts , inattention to what we planners ca ll "ex te rn a lit ies " or 
s id e-e ffec ts , and resistance to meaningful participation in the decision 
process by those other than highway engineers.
Against this backdrop, the preceding two papers by Donald C. Hyde and 
Albert S. Porter present an in teresting study in contrast. Hyde, former 
general manager o f Cleveland Transit System, focuses heavily on finance, 
changes in administration to ease financia l problems, and possible methods 
o f supplementing the inadequate revenues o f  the "fare-box". He describes 
a series o f transit-re la ted  studies in the Cleveland area over the past 
twenty years which are mostly gathering dust fo r  want o f an adequate financ­
ing vehicle. In his paper the words "debt" and "financing" appear twenty- 
three times. He makes clear that new capital projects cannot be expected 
out o f the "fare-box."
Porter, on the other hand, as long-time Cuyahoga County Engineer and 
former head o f the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party, projects the view o f 
the prototypical highway engineer. Most o f his plans since 1928 have been 
translated into concrete and stee l by virtue o f the 1956 Federal Aid High­
ways Act. He has accomplished much; he is proud o f his accomplishments 
and o f his professional techniques, he is  chafing at the restraints coming 
from his c r it ic s  and he is anxious to get on with the job. The two papers 
provide useful summaries o f the transportation planning process in this 
area over the past f i f t y  years. I see no need to restate the salient points 
in each paper. However, I think that i t  is important to note that both men 
assume a number o f normative concepts and some o f these w ill provide the 
basis fo r  my comments.
Hyde : 1. Rapid transit extensions including a downtown Cleveland
subway and transit lanes in freeways are desirable and 
should be bu ilt.
2. An an ti-transit bias exists among highway o f f ic ia ls  
which tends to negate transit projects no matter how 
worthwhile.
23.
3. Substantial revenues should be made available to mass 
transit to supplement the "fare-box" since mass transit 
serves the general public in terest.
Porter: 1. Highway improvements are desirable and should be bu ilt
as quickly as possible.
2. The location  o f  highway projects and routes should be 
le f t  to  the highway engineer.
3. Engineering c r ite r ia , i . e . , t r a f f ic  service and cost, 
should control route selection. Other c r ite r ia  such as 
"community goals, . . . loss o f tax base, relocation" 
are "vague and intangib le", and they, along with recent 
review procedures, have added unnecessary cost to the 
highway planning process.
4. The articu la te  public, i . e . ,  newspapermen and "unin­
formed, unqualified and unenlightened c itizen s" should 
not be confused with the larger public which supports 
a l l  proposed highway construction.
I do not propose to argue or agree with any o f  these propositions d i­
rectly . What I shall do is  comment on the papers and some o f these norma­
tive  views while addressing myself to two basic questions:
1. Why do highway departments in Cuyahoga County and everywhere 
else continue to  su ffer charges o f unresponsiveness in spite 
o f the laudatory "3-C" regulations o f the 1962 Highway Act 
which called fo r  a "cooperative, comprehensive and continuing 
planning process" as a basis fo r  a l l  federally-aided highways?
2. What steps might be taken to mute th is critic ism  while develop­
ing a more f le x ib le  transportation policy  to better f i t  the 
varied p r io r it ie s  o f the nation's urban areas?
Let me begin with the "3 -C 's" o f the 1962 Highway Act to which Mr. 
Porter has added a fourth --  "cos tly ".
The highway planning process must be cooperative. This suggests that 
the highway bureaucracy - -  the Bureau o f Public Roads (BPR), the State 
Highway Departments and loca l highway o f f ic ia ls  -- must develop plans in 
concert with local and regional planning agencies so that local considera­
tions with regard to land use, housing and other community values would be 
reflected  in the plans as w ell as purely technical t r a f f ic  considerations.
The guidelines to assure "cooperation" in the transportation planning 










fTom BPR which required that local communities acknowledge th e ir  access
to information and awatmmc Af th Ù p l a n n i n g  p i u i - t a a  Ju .-uug1 i
a memorandum o f understanding. Through this memorandum, loca l bodies would 
f u l f i l l  the statutory need fo r  cooperative planning. But the procedures 
and techniques o f the transportation planning process were l e f t  with the 
highway engineers who would insure technical competence.
Under th is operational format, the in it ia t iv e  fo r  establishing the 
essential structure o f the highway system has remained with highway agencies, 
with local or regional planning bodies being called upon only to r a t ify  the 
proposed system or make marginal adjustments to i t .
A loca l Cleveland example might be instructive. The in tersta te  net­
work proposed by the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency (NOACA) 
which has responsib ility  fo r  transportation planning, 204 and A-95 reviews 
in a seven-county region, is  essen tia lly  that proposed by the highway bur­
eaucracy.^/ For one east-west link in this system, two a lternatives were 
proposed — a Northern and a Southern Heights Corridor. NOACA's technical 
s ta f f  recommended the Northern Corridor. The Planning Council o f  NOACA 
made up o f  the directors o f a l l  regional planning commissions unanimously 
recommended "further study" on both corridors as did the NOACA Steering 
Committee. The a ffected  municipalities unanimously supported the further 
study proposal. But the NOACA Board overwhelmingly recommended the South­
ern Heights Corridor as proposed by the County Engineer.
In no case, to my knowledge, has the requirement fo r  the cooperation 
o f loca l government specified  in the 1962 Highway Act been interpreted to 
mean that any local government's refusal to cooperate'would block federal 
highway operations.
I t  is  not surprising that many viewers o f th is process see not cooper­
ation (c o lle c t iv e  action for common benefit) but merely the co-optation o f 
loca l representatives who provide data, financial support and symbolic 
legitimacy fo r  projects dominated by the needs o f highway departments. 
Further, i t  is  not surprising to find regional planning and review agencies 
such as NOACA intensely supportive o f the needs o f the highway bureaucracy 
given the fragmentation o f local p o lit ic a l jurisdictions and planning 
agencies compared with the long-term, well-organized, w e ll-s ta ffed  and 
well-financed highway departments.
But the basic issue involving the unmet need fo r  cooperation goes much 
deeper than the techno-political construct described above. There exists 
a fundamental difference o f objectives between the highway agencies and in-
1. See, particu larly , PPM 50-9 "Urban Transportation Planning," June 
21, 1967.
2. Cleveland/Seven County Transportation/Land Use Study, A Framework for 




dividual urbanized communities, and un til these objectives can be recon­
c iled , true cooperation may be impossible. C ities lik e  Cleveland and, 
many others, are concerned about displaced populations, housing, declining 
tax bases, and the destruction o f community. They cannot "cooperate" in 
the support o f programs which promise to deepen their problems by clearance 
of vast rights-of-way which are technically ju s t if ie d  by the "need" o f the 
region to move more cars faster. I f  the c it ie s  are to agree to th e ir  par­
t ia l  dismemberment, some large-scale value trade-offs  are in order. I w ill 
suggest some p o s s ib ilit ie s  along this line la te r , but le t  me turn now to 
another o f the "3-C 's" — comprehensiveness.
The 1962 Act states that the planning process must be comprehensive.
This requirement in s is ts  that the areawide highway system be planned with 
fu ll consideration fo r  a l l  relevant factors --  population sh ifts  and pro­
jections, economic analysis, land use patterns, and even "soc ia l and com­
munity value fa c to rs ." !/  City planners would have no argument with this 
concept in spite o f the debate currently raging in the profession on the 
p o ss ib ilit ie s  and lim its o f comprehensiveness. But comprehensiveness, as 
interpreted by BPR, rela tes to fu ll coverage o f the technical elements o f 
transportation planning with only an occasional nod to the rest o f the 
world. Zoning and land use control is not the highway department's problem. 
As Mr. Porter states: "the best plan is  good only until the next meeting o f 
municipal Council." Transit t f ip  demand becomes a net residual a fte r  auto­
mobile tr ips have been estimated. Housing need, when id en tified , becomes a 
yellow blob on a land use plan, and neighborhood and environmental factors 
are almost completely disregarded in establishing the c r it e r ia  leading to 
corridor selection.
Again a loca l example might be illuminating. The comprehensive re ­
port o f the Cleveland Seven County Transportation Land Use Study estab­
lishes twenty-six c r ite r ia  to "measure the re la tive  merits o f  the transpor­
tation systems" i t  proposes.2/  Of these, th irteen or h a lf, are environmental 
c r ite r ia . Imposing! On closer inspection however, i t  develops that a ll 
"environmental factors" comprise only 30% o f the to ta l weighted c r ite r ia  
and that the elimination o f irreplaceable h is to rica l s ites  or parkland is 
covered under "Historical/Natural/Architectural S ites" which makes up .9% 
of the to ta l while something called "separation-bisection" (actua lly  re ­
lating to the disruption o f neighborhoods) makes up 4.5% o f to ta l c r ite r ia .
I t  is  not my intention to disparage these c r ite r ia  or the weighting 
system. Rather, I simply wish to observe that other groups with d ifferen t 
objectives might p refer other methods to "measure the re la tiv e  merits o f 
the transportation systems." That these approaches are not represented sug­
gests anything but the comprehensiveness implied by the "3-C 's" regulation.
It  also suggests that Mr. Hyde's easy confidence that "environmental and 
social factors w i l l  be taken into consideration" by organizations such as 




A Framework fo r  Action, pp. 23-24.
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The "3-C 's" need no further belaboring, but 1 be lieve  the point has 
been made that the promises o f the 1962 Highway Act to  bring highways into
harmony with the urban environment have not been fu lf i l le d . They are nnr
l ik e ly  to be fu l f i l le d  in the future, unless highway o f f ic ia ls  tru ly  accept 
the principles o f local partic ipation  and coordinated land use and m ulti­
modal transportation planning. So long as the highway bureaucracy regards 
the "3-C 's" and sim ilar leg is la tion  as an unnecessary and disruptive force 
threatening progress and th e ir  established procedures, future regulations 
in th is area are lik e ly  to be heavily compromised.
Let me turn now to ways by which an urban transportation po licy  might 
be developed to meet a greater variety  o f  c lien t needs and so accommodate 
many o f the c r it ic s  o f present p o lic ies .
F irs t, i t  seems to  me that we must improve the balance between highway 
and other forms o f transportation investment, particu larly  those means o f 
transportation which serve the needs o f the e ld er ly , the poor and the young. 
The reason that thi£ point is  the highest item on my agenda arises from a 
moral imperative. lAs a society we have opted fo r  an automotive c iv iliza tio n . 
In the process, the national majority which p ro fits  from this increased mo­
b i l i t y  has ignored those injured by i t .  As any place-bound resident o f any 
c ity  can te s t i fy ,  i f  he is too young, too old, or too poor to^jlrive^/ther^ 
are fewer and fewer places he can reach by conventional transit^  *tfTnis ^ Is2 
p artly  the result o f the increased scatteration o f new development taking 
place at low densities impossible to  achieve without the highway and the 
car, and partly because o f declining service by public transit as a function 
o f shrinking ridership and revenues.
I t  is clear that we have a major ob ligation to those unable to  get 
around by car -- the worker who must reach his newly-suburbanized job via 
car-pool and two buses; the e ld erly  widow who has not v is ited  her friend 
in a year because she liv es  six miles away and can 't make connections; the 
housewife o f a poor family who must shop two or three times a week by bus.^Q 
I t  is  th is group which must be the prime beneficiary o f changes in trans­
portation p o licy . I t  is  service to th is group which best ju s t if ie s  the 
name "public tran s it." And i t  is  this p r io r ity  which must be emphasized 
again and again at the highest leve ls , le s t the transportation changes now 
proposed be used simply to further improve the situation o f  those groups 
now served so well by our soc ie ty 's  present p o lic ies .
I do not believe we w ill  be able to serve the needs o f th is transit- 
dependent population by building new ra il transit systems or by extending 
existing ones. Rather, I suspect that the needs o f th is large transit-
In the City o f Cleveland this group is  substantial, indeed. By our 
best estimates, in 1965 32% o f a l l  households did not own th e ir  own 
car. Of the estimated 45,000 fam ilies with annual incomes under 
$4,000, 46% own no car. Of the households headed by persons over 
65, 48% had no car.
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dependent population can best be provided by systems that supply door-to- 
door service on demand. Whether this service is made available through 
jitn eys, subsidized tax is , dial-a-bus or even subsidized car ownership, i t  
seems fa ir  that highway users bear part o f the cost.
In addition to serving the needs o f the transit-dependent population, 
lo ca l' governments need some other real choices in transportation policy  
that re fle c t  local p r io r it ie s . Such choices are now rendered almost im­
possible by the nature o f transportation funding. In a situation where 
in ter-state highways cost Cleveland only 5% o f project cost while mass 
transit "solutions" cost 100%, I submit that real options do not ex ist.
How do we re c t ify  this?
Federal aid for urban highways has been massive since 1956 and current­
ly  totals over $2 b il l io n  each year. Federal mass transit aid however, 
dates only from 1964 and up to just recently, to ta lled  only $175 m illion 
a year. I t  may be assumed that the backlog o f unmet transit needs is far 
greater than highway needs. I would therefore propose that we handle this 
situation by simply increasing the leve l o f funding for mass transit out 
o f the highway trust fund -- a proposal that already is the thrust o f sev­
eral Congressional b i l ls .  Perhaps a reasonable goal would be a catch-up 
decade during which 50% o f a l l  transportation allocations would go to mass 
transit.
A step in this d irection would be Congressional authorization fo r  the 
Secretary o f DOT to approve state applications to use part o f th e ir  highway 
allocations fo r  public transit purposes. Logically , an application o f  this 
sort should emanate from a State Department o f Transportation. (Given pre­
sent views, i t  is un likely that such a request would emanate from a State 
Highway Department.) Were mass transit funds to be made available on a 
large scale, local communities interested in transit rather than highways 
would be encouraged to develop th e ir  ideas in formal proposals, as is  now 
taking place in response to the new Public Transportation Assistance Act 
o f 1970.
The problem o f compensation is another area o f con flic t in highway 
development. A "great leap forward" was taken with the compensation pro­
visions o f the Highway Act o f 1968. I f  they are vigorously enforced, much 
needed equity w ill  enter the relocation picture.
1. Homeowners w il l  receive up to $5,000 above market value for 
purchase o f comparable property. 234
2. Renters w ill receive up to $1,500 for comparable quarters 
either as rent subsidy or down payment on a purchase.
3. Displacees w ill  receive reasonable moving expenses.
4. Displaced businesses w ill  receive up to $5,000 for loss o f 
patronage or good w ill.
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» I would lik e  to make a further suggestion using the Century Freeway
experience in Watts as a guide post. The rule set out here whs that no 
resident w a s  to he le ft w n r c e  o ff  a c  a T û f l l l  1 o f  l l l e  f t f f t ô w a y . H o m e o w n e r s  
would be le f t  in the same mortgage and equity position, renters in the 
same rental position. To redeem this promise, the State Highway Depart­
ment developed replacement housing on scattered s ites using highway money 
fo r  that purpose.
Perhaps this excellent precedent can be expanded further so that no 
c ity  would be l e f t  worse o f f  as a resu lt o f a freeway. Again, le t  us turn 
to a local example o f  what this approach might mean in practice.
The Parma Freeway is  now proposed to cut through the west side o f the 
City of Cleveland running north-south and connecting 1-71, 1-90 and the 
Memorial Shoreway. Estimates suggest the firs t-cu t economic and social 
loss to the City would be in the follow ing magnitude fo r  the right-of-way 
proposed: 924 fam ilies displaced, 63 commercial businesses eliminated, 36
industrial businesses displaced, $5.7 m illion loss o f  assessed valuations 
to the tax duplicate and an annual tax loss o f $391,000. In addition the 
C ity 's  share o f the cost is  expected to be 25 or 50% since the highway is  
not on the in terstate  system.
Under these circumstances, I judge that Cleveland would find  accom­
modation impossible. But talking room exists i f  the State Highway Depart­
ment or some other, more comprehensive transportation/development agency 
could (1) absorb the entire cost, and (2) rebuild the los t housing in the 
c ity  on a un it-for-un it basis while also compensating the c ity  fo r  its  
loss o f tax revenue. These costs would be lessened by deducting any new 
tax rateables developed as a result o f freeway construction as well as 
other "in-puts" into the c ity  economy. This formula would put the c ity  in 
line with the ground-rule that i t  would not be le f t  worse o f f  than before 
the highway, and would almost guarantee widespread support fo r  the highway 
program and continued high appropriations.
Let me make one last observation and comment on the preceding papers. 
Mr. Porter says that "major highways . . . streets . . . roads . . . o r  
what have you pay fo r  themselves through gasoline tax and license tag fees 
as a user tax in the c lassic form." There is  a great body o f  urban econo­
mic research that suggests this is not exactly the case — at least -- with 
reference to congested downtown streets where the driver pays far less than 
the fu ll  investment o f  the fa c i l i t ie s  he uses.* Here the driver does not 
pay taxes on land occupied by thoroughfares, nor does he pay proportionate­
ly  fo r  the parking congestion and safety problems he creates. In the urban 
core, Philadelphia estimates i t  pays $50 a year more per auto than i t  takes
* Thompson, Wilbur, A Preface on Urban Economics, pp. 367-368.
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in, and Milwaukee $90.*
There is a general understanding that no feasible amount o f highway 
investment w ill  decongest peak hour tx a f f ic  in core areas. As William 
Vickrey has noted, "Sometimes a f a c i l i t y  becomes worthless prec ise ly  be­
cause i t  is fre e ."
I would therefore suggest, along with many economists, that a street 
use pricing system be instituted in our crowded urban areas-, where detailed 
research indicates this is  appropriate.
This "surcharge" would be levied  in accord with the high cost o f pro­
viding service on particu lar streets at particu lar times. Motorists un­
w illin g  to pay the surcharge would use other streets and decongest c r it ic a l 
ones. Mass transit vehicles would enjoy greatly  reduced travel times which 
would lik e ly  increase patronage and service. Motorists su ffic ien tly  a f­
fluent to pay the surcharge would enjoy a more e ffic ie n t  fa c i l i t y ,  while 
the revenues thus generated could be used to further improve circu lation 
within street use t o l l  zones.
Concluding, I have tr ied  to respond to the previous two papers con­
structively , with the general argument that the entire urban transportation 
problem could (1) be eased by accommodating, rather than scornfully r e je c t­
ing, its  c r it ic s , (2) be rendered more equitable by serving the needs o f 
the transit-dependent population as the highest p rio rity . That my sugges­
tions may be controversial does not disturb me. What is v ita l is that 
those with policy responsib ility  fo r  transportation take a fresh look at 
their own preconceptions in the broadest sense o f the public in terest. I f ,  
in company with the other panelists, I have helped accomplish that, these 
AIP/D0T Metropolitan Transportation Seminars w ill have been most worthwhile.
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A GntOSCOPE FOR THE GENERAL PLAN 
The ~ong-r.ange planning staff will deal in information, criti-
~ism and advice. our audience will be those who influence or make 
· We take upon ourselves a special role with respect to that 
audi~ae. The information, criticism, and advice we offer wil1 be 
informed by a vision we have for the City of Cleveland and its 
people. This vision is utopian in that it is admittedly normative, 
. , arising from our own conceptions of the 119ood life 11 for people. It · 
.'·is. not utopian in that it may point to a direction the City can 
~~oos• and can follow, a direction that distinquishes among.~esir-
' 
able and undesirable actions taken yesterday, and today, and 
taken tomorrow. 
our vision (in outline) is as follows: 
--Individuals choose their own goals and means to pursue those · . ., 
goals. 
. '·. 
.. ···~ ·. . 
. ···~ "'··· · .• "' k 
--societal values and conditions act as constraints upon-...,_ i.,.__,.-;; •... :.:_;·i . 
.i1¥5'r.;:" . "' 
· individual selection and .pursuit of qoals. 
. -.:;,~ 
--societal values are questionable insofar as they unnecessa~:.. : ~i 
restrict choice and to the extent that they are inconaist;_8 - . ·:~ 
with one another. _;,?:~·· ' . .. :~ .!'.~:~:· . 
--Institutions are established to serve individual pursuit of 
g.oals. In the process institutions, themselves, establish 






--Institutional goals which'are self-serving, however, must be 
clearly secondary and supportive of institutional goals 
furthering pursuit of individual goals • 
. 
--Societal values and conditions also act as constraint.a upon 
institutional selection and pu.rsuit of goals. But, unlike 
individual selection and pursuit of goals, institutional 
selection and pursuit of goals affect societal values and 
conditions. Institutions are, therefore, the focus for 
changes in societal values and conditions • 
--Both individuals and institutions pursue their respective 
:;· · goals through decision and action. Decisions to act must be 
made from among those choices of action which the individual 
or institution perceives. 
--Individuals are better off ·with more choices in any decision. 
--Institutions serve individual goals most when they proviqe 
wid.er choices in decisions made by individuals. 
--The primary goal of institutions must be to provide wider 
choices, partly through their own decisions and actions, partly 
·through their affect on societal values and conditions. 
--In a context of limited resources, first and priority att~n­
.:;?t.~~--
tion should be given to the task of promoting wider choices 





·.' ~~- I 
u 
A BRIDGE OVER MUDDY.WATERS 
-~Given this goal as a direction for change, what policies 
should we as, a City, pursue in order to ser·ve that goal? 
--Income ~nd power are important genera~ors of choice. Poli-
. cies dealing with changes in the level and distribution of 
income and power are, therefore, necessary guides in r.each-
ing our goal. 
--But,. any given level and distribution of income does not, 
autoinatically, lead to more choices in private and public 
goods and services. Prevailing political, social, and eco-
nomic trends, for example, are toward a systematic narrowing 
·· of choice for all, but a very few. Policies dealing with 
these trends in the response of the private and public sec~ 
tors are additional guides in reaching the goal of more 
choices for individuals wl10 have few or none. These policies 
will widen choice for the majority as well as the minority. 
~-'lhere are, thus, two (2) broad areas of policy: 
l. Policies to promote changes in the level and 
distribution of income toward some more equitable · 
allocation of the rewards of our productive system1 
:. 
and 
2. Policies to. improve the choices in·qoods and 
services offered by the private and public sectors 











income and power. 
~-Both·areas of policy m~st be included in an effective 
thrust toward the goal of promoting choices where few or 
none exist. 
·-'l'he two (2) broad areas of policy can be further subdivided 
by reference to the diagram which charts the important parts 
of the system within which we work and the relationshiPs 
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Bach arrow represents a relationship which will be 
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-~More specific areas of policy under the general area of 
policies dealing with the level and distribution of income 
. and power include: 
(2) Private sector payments and trar.&sf.:l~s of 
• 
income to individuals. 
(3) Public sector payments and trans!'e:i;.-.; .:>f 
.. 
income to individuals. 
(5) Public sector allocation of power to individuals. 
(8) Relationship between. individua:l income and power • 
.(11) Payments and transfers of income among individuals. 
(12) Transfers of power among individuals • 
--More specific areas of policy under the general area of 
policies to improve response of the private and public 
sectors include: 




Individual payments to public sector institutions. 
Response of the public sector to individual power. 
--Each of these policy areas serves as an initial framework 
. . 
for a work program. The objective of each work program will 
,_ 
~ be to devise altern~tive policies for the accomplishnlent,&~f 
the goal before us. Priority in work programming will also . 
be assigned in view of our qoal. Thus. policy areas which 











.fffS PRIMROSE PATH FROM GOAL TO WORK PROGRAM 
~-Xn order to determine what these policy areas might be. con-
sider the laek of choices confronting an individual who lacks 
income. '.l'heoretically, he has a numb~r of options for gain-
_inq ilicome. He may become employed, he may acquire capital 
(anct,.-thus, realize income from earnings on the investment 
of that capital), he may apply for public or private assis-
tance in the form of "welfare" or charity, he may bo~row or 
ask for money from his fr1end·s or family, or he may acquire 
income t.hrouqb some illegal ac;!tivity (robbery, burglary, ' 
()ambling, etc.). 
•-SUppose this individual cannot get a job, does not own nor 
can he possibly acquire capit~~· and is not eligible for 
-. 
public or private assistance. ai~~oices remaining are 
- not hopeful, nor does his exercise o;-~er remaining. 
choice eontri~ute to our goal. 
iu1 in borrowing or obtaining income from his.frien 
family, c::hances are good that this transfer of income will 
be from poor to poor. l~aving his friend or family even 
worse off than they were. Further, though the transfer· 1 
may be made. it is obviously made grudgingly a 
up a conflict among those who already suffer under 
..,,, 
~ ·~~ 
conflicts suffi.cient to undermine their life (and society --~-~ ~. '~· 










to that of committing crime leaves him with no real choice 
~' all. In fact, this is the one choice we cannot permit • 
" The possibility of obtaining income through illegal activity 
IJ:l'181J )\JQ. reduced if not removed altogether. 
" 
·."'•The policy implications of this are clear. on the one hand, 
policies establishing an adequate income guarantee to all 
individuals based on need must be devised. At the same time, 
policies must be devised to reduce the effective income to 
be gained from illegal activity. 
--A minimum, but adequate, income guarantee program would in-
clude policy determinations on such ma~ters as eligibility, . 
work incentive, and level of: basic allowance or guarantee .• 
~-Reducing the effective income of criminal activity would 
require policies as to: 
1. Possible· changes in the definition of criminal 
activity--gambling can be a crime or a local industry. 
2, Ways of decreasing possible revenues· from criminal 
activity, by increasing the responsibility of victims 
or by reducing the opportunities for criminal activity. 
3. Ways of increasing the probability of apprehension, 
either in fact, or as. perceived by the criminal. L~. 
. . "'.;,f.i~~·' 
--successful pursuit of these policies would provide a choice 
the indivi~ual did not enjoy before (eligibility for a mini-





choice of criminal activity less preferred. 
--Most individuals who lack income would prefer employment as 
a means to income over public assistance, transfers from 
friends and family or illegal activity. Those who cannot 
choose employment as a means to income fall somewhere in 
th-a follc•:1ing oi:.tline of th.9 re;::r::ons for une1J1ployment or 
underemployment--in some cases tha reason fo.r an individual 
not even being i.n the labo:r. 1:'.orce. 
l~ Supply of labor exists, dema~d for labor does not 
a. Changes in the level, composition and organi-
zational structure of national output. 
b. Changes in the level and composition of 
regional output 
c. Discrimination in hiring on racial, sexual, 
religious, or other grounds 
d, Arbitrary employment requirements based upon 
education level rather than ability 
e. Underemployment 
2. Supply of labor does not exist, demand does 
a. Individual is not qualified 
1. He perceives himself as not qualified 
2. He is not qualified 
b.· Individual is qualified, but not willing to work 
1. Wages too low 
2. Job location inaccessible 
e -
3, Working conditions-safety and health 
or time off
4. Family or other responsibilities
c. Individual does not know that demand exists
d . Individual is not physically capable
1. Poor mental or physical health
2. Alcoholic or addict
-In those cases where supply exists, demand does not, policies 
to promote choice in employment would include those designed 
to:
4
1. Encourage economic development of city and region 
in specific categories of economic activity,
2. Insure equal employment opportunity.
3. Encourage re-assessmemt of work tasks and personnel 
requirements by public agencies, private firms, 
and unions in the area.
4. Maintain the demand for labor through public service 
employment of those willing but out of work.
5. Encourage migration to or from the area.
-In those cases where supply does not exist but demand does, 
policies would include those designed to:
1. Improve the flow of information about job openings 
and the counseling of those searching for work.
2. Improve the working conditions of those employed.
9
3.
closer proximity to employment centers.
4. Equip individuals with the special skills and 
talents that jobs with promise require.
-Throughout our discussion of policies above, we have dealt 
in detail only with those encompassed in the broad area of 
policy directed toward a change in the level and distribu­
tion of income toward a more equitable distribution to 
those with little income. In the event that the chosen 
combination of policies is in some way successful in improv­
ing the relative income position of the poor, we still have 
that important set of policies remaining to insure that the 
increase in income does, in fact, promote wider choices in
Permit ôHôÎÆê ô£ lfôôiëlantial accommodations in
-WouldT* for instance, a change in the distribution of income 
as a result of the policies above, promote wider choices for 
the poor in housing? Specifically, would individuals and • 
families living in substandard homes now be able to choose 
standard housing at rents they can afford? Or will the costs 
of supplying and maintaining housing at local standards
f  , k^ï «çi&
still place the unit out of their reach?
-For. many families, the dilemma is clear. "Standard" housing 
in central City locations is costly. Rents to support the 
construction or rehabilitation of these units is then neces­
-10
sarily high. Incomes, Item which »»ehtS BMSt tö paid, 010
low and burdened with other demands— food, clothing, trans­
portation. The gap between the rents which must be paid and 
the rents which could be paid must be narrowed by policies 
to increase incomes of poor families and individuals (already 
discussed above) and policies to reduce the cost of "standard" 
units-in effect to improve the response of the private and 
public sectors in the provision of housing for low-income 
families.
-An obvious first step is the development of policies to ad­
just the local standards.
-Policies will also be required in those areas of cost which 





-If a "standard" home is to include important neighborhood 
service levels, policies will be necessary in the areas of:
1. The level, quality and distribution of services 
(schools, recreation, safety, etc.) in the City.
2. The choice of location in an area or municipality 
where services are "standard."
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-An important, and newly-emerging area of policy# would to 
those directed toward improving a household's capacity to 
pay rent through a program of housing allowances. This 
kind of program, along with improvement in neighborhood 
service levels will be necessary to assure some demand for 
standard housing in many areas of the City where no effec­
tive demand now exists.
-Promoting choices in housing is only one ares of concern 
in our consideration of the response of the private and 
public sector. Other areas would include certain private 
consumption goods aâ well as a hose of public services in­
cluding education, recreation, public safety, and sanitation.
-Further, the discussion so far has not directly concerned 
itself with either the distribution of power or the response 
of the public sector to this auxiliary form of command over 
goods and services.
-This paper, is admittedly, only a demonstration of the pro­
cess the general planning staff is following to develop a 
direction for ourselves and the Planning Commission and to use 
that direction as a guide in the development of policies 
for the City of Cleveland.
-This demonstration, however, should make clear how the 
challenge we have set before us differs from typical 
planning practice.
- 12
— First, we have established a single, relatively specific 
goal; and this was established with reference to our vision 
of the way a society ought to be. It is basically4 a moral 
stance,©nour part* and places us in a clear advocate posi- 
tion in favor of those who
— Second, the connection between this goal and the policies 
developed will be explicit and ove^^ading. As a result, 
some traditional policies and programs of planning 
agencies mayj^nat^appear. At the same time, many policies 
(and areas of concern) new to planning agencies will be
. it%ü>in prominent positions.
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SHORTMANUAL ON STYLE FOR ADVOCATE PLANNERS
Certain obstacles (and opportunities) are inherent in this 
approach to planning and obvious beforehand. Our style of opera­
tion must recognize theses
1. To promote social change is to accept social con­
flict. We agree to submit all conflicts to those 
executive, legal and legislative tribunals for 
resolution and to accept the resolution which is 
forthcoming. At the same time^w®^ro#use»to minimize
*• 4£« ^or cloéd'fthose conflicts, before decieion-makers «
Conflicts-ininterests and ideas are not to be
5 ixJn.-- <b->avoided». They are to be sharpened and clarified so 
that those who mist decide^make clear choices based 
on m€HPO fundamental precepts.
2 . To cast our vision in iw w  fundamental terms is to
!/, -:T^,a.vassure that our breadth ofJtconcern will eventually
U M  A++»,. ■' -Maencompass a-ïl. Our limited' resources will not 
permit a "comprehensive" analysis to match our 
framework for planning. We must admit that our 
eventual plan will not be comprehensive in the 
generic sense of that term., Still, each part we
,SC;
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accomplish of the total effort required will at 
least be informed and conditioned by knowledge of 
its place in a broader scheme. Further, the more 
comprehensive framework provides the same perspec­
tive to others in their various capacities through­
out the City. Their work will be on our behalf in 
that sense.
There can be no "best" way for there can be no "best" 
goal. This or that policy or program might, in some 
limited sense, be the "best" way to serve some given 
goal. But the determination of a "best" goal will 
fail for lack of criteria. Selection from among 
alternative goals is the difficult task of political 
decision-makers. Their selection is not of the "best" 
goal, only their selection of an alternative. Our 
selection of a goal, and all subsequent policy design 
based on that selection, does not presume that de­
cision-makers will select that goal, too. It will 
assure, however, that that goal will always be in 
front of decision-makers as an alternative during 
times of decision.
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4. A healthy, pragmatic skepticism will be of in­
valuable assistance in our efforts, toward our own 
actions and decisions as well as others. Our frame­
work of analysis will give this skepticism great 
force and direction. In every case, in all de­
cisions, there are only a few questions:
What explicit (or more likely, implicit) goal 
will decision one way or the other serve in 
this matter?
In what way does service to that goal affect 
service to our goal?
In most cases these questions will not be easy to 
answer, but if our action (review, approval, etc.) 
is the one sought, the responsibility for answering 
the question is not entirely ours.
5. Our goal springs directly from those egalitarian 
ideals which are rooted in the rhetoric of our his­
tory. To fix ourselves, with professional integrity 
and abilities, upon that goal is to become the 
conscience of our society. As such, we will be
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beaten back at every hard choice. To take as our 
measure of success the number and importance of 
changes made in institutions or the things which 
"get done" is to invite frustration. A more valid 
measure of our success would be those small, some­
times fleeting, changes in men's minds, those 
important (but invisible) succumbings by an indi­
vidual to his own conscience, and the new dedication, 
new purpose of individuals to those ideals we hold 
but only haltingly strive for.
WORK ELEMENTS - THE FIRST TWO YEARS IN CLEVELAND
First, it must be understood that no city planning agency 
can survive with a work program ignoring its charter-delegated 
responsibilities. The zoning, land-use, site-selection studies 
and mandatory referrals continue to be processed by Commission 
staff, conditioned by our advocacy viewpoint. The analytical 
policy studies, however, which are designed to promote improved 
ranges of choice for those with few choices in our society were 
assigned to a newly-created Comprehensive Planning Section.
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It was clearly impossible for the limited staff ((five
professionals) of the Comprehensive Planning Section cf the
Planning Commission to undertake a broad range of studies and■IIanalyses with the view of developing a "comprehensive {plan“
|[
directed toward the broad objectives set out in earlier sections*
1And this strategy may not be desirable in any event. Further, 
some policy-directed analysis was already being pursued by 
other agencies in the area. The relationship of theijr efforts
[ I 
ifto ours was clear from the conceptual framework developed earlier.
i '
In these cases, no substantial effort was required .from us. Thus,
we decided to employ our limited resources in intensive analysis
! ;/ : 
t vof those issues on which decisions were imminent çjr legislation
was pending and little effort was being made, in/jthe hope of
ft
exercising influence disproportionate to our numbers
a
Our efforts, and accomplishments, can be Separated into two
hgroups : //! ;
1, Studies and analyses of policies cf^signed to promote/• ! i
changes in the level and distribution of income and 
power, and
2. Studies and analyses of policies designed to improve 
City resident choices in goods and services offered 
by the private and public sectors.
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Policies to promote changes in the, level and distribution of
income and power -
In the first group uhould be included two major projects —  
an early and continuing analysis of federal legislation in public 
assistance reform and the design ....nu promotion of changes in that 
legislation to better serve our r distribution of income objec­
tive,!/ and a study^/ of the feasibility of redevelopment of a 
substantial vacant and vandalized industrial area for a neighbor­
hood economic development organization with no funds nor staff.
In the former effort our long-run objective was a redistri­
bution of income through much needed reform in our public as­
sistance program. The short-run objective was to place informa­
tion, critical analysis and alternative programs in the hands of 
Mayor Carl B . Stokes, and U. S. Congressmen who could, from their 
forum, hope to influence the decisions being made about this 
legislation at the national level. In the process, we were able
HJ The Proposed Federal Family Assistance Plan; A Critique, Some 
Suggested Modifications and Their Impact on the City of Cleve­
land, August 1970, General Plan Report No. 2, City Planning 
Commission, City of Cleveland, 45 pp.
**/ Economic Feasibility Analysis? Industrial Redevelopment of 
National Screw and Perfection Stove Property, March, 1971, 
Special General Plan Report, City Planning Commission, City 
of Cleveland, 23 pp.
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t o a c c o m p l i s h o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s . O u r e s ^ o s i t i o n o f t h e i s s u e s i n
t h i s c r u c i a l r e f o r m a n d o u r a n a l y s i s o f t h e i m p a c t o f c h a n g e s i n
public assistance on the city impressed the Planning commission
w i t h t h e i n ^ r t a n c e o f f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e a t t h e f e d e r a l l e v e l i n
m a t t e r s o f l o c a l c o n c e r n . O u r p r o b l e m o f m a r g i n a l r e t a i l c e n t e r s ,
f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d b e s i g n i fi c a n t l y c h a n g e d t ^ i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n
of a just and adequate income maintenance program for such a pro
g r a m w o u l d p r o v i d e a c r u c i a l m i s s i n g i n g r e d i e n t i n o u r s o l u t i o n s
to t he d i l emma — a subs tan t i a l g row th i n t he demand f o r r e t a i l
goods and serv ices (as h igh as $40 mi l l ion of new esqpendi tures
a n n u a l l y ) .
I n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , ( t h e e c o n o m i c f e a s i b i l i t y a n a l y s i s ) o u r
immed ia te ob jec t i ve was t o t r ans fe r t he powe r o f p l ann ing p ro fes
s i o n a l s — t h e i r a c c e s s t o i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e i r c r i t i c a l a n a l ; ^ t i c a l
s k i l l a a n d t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l r o l e — t o a g r o u p C o m p o s e d m a i n l y
o f l o w - i n c o m e b l a c k s w h o h a d n e i t h e r t h e r e s o u r c e s n o r t h e s k i l l s
}
t o dea l w i th a conp lex redeve lopmen t scheme^ The u l t ima te ob jec
t ive was to promote redeve lopment o f land burdened by obso le te ,
v a c a n t a n d v a n d a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s i n t o i n d u s t r i a l u s e t o f u r t h e r
the' availed>ility of jobs immediately at hand to the neighborhood;
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t h u s t o a c c o m p l i s h s o m e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n c o m e , t o o . T h e o u t
c o m e o f t h e s t u ^ w a s s p e c i fi c a n d r e a l i s t i c . I f r e d e v e l c ^ m e n t
w e r e t o t a k e p l a c Q , c l e a r p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e s u b s i d i e s w e r e n e e d e d
a n d t h e s e w e r e c a r e f u l l y s p e l l e d o u t i n d e t a i l .
I n t h i s c a s e , i t b e c a m e c l e a r t o u s t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e n o
redevelopmeni: of land into industrial use in many areas of Cleve
land until heavy private or public sxibsidies to support the demand
for industrial land are available. No feasible amount of subsidy
toward the cost of acquiring land, demolishing structures and
: constructing new facilities would make an industrial redevelopment
project pay in that area without assurance of some adequate
r e v e n u e s f r o m e v e n t u a l t e n a n t s .
; Low-Income Housing - Choices in housing - particularly choices
in s tanda rd hous ing fo r l ow and modera te - i ncome househo lds ~ i s
a clear need in Cleveland as in other major cit ies. The basic
i :
problem, of course, is that the poor cannot afford housing de-
i
fined by ourselves as "standard," and our society is unwillii^^ to
commi t t he subs tan t i a l f unds needed t o house t hese f am i l i e s i n
public housing! uni1:8 nor is i t wil l ing to provide choices — in
location or type — eunong those units it does construct.
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Planning Commission staff have developed a proposai for a new
kind of housing subsidy —  a so-called "housing allowance" — • which 
the Mayor has made to the National League of Cities and will sub­
mit to Congress. The issues raised by this proposal and the 
questions which need answers before embarking upon such a program 
nation-wide are the subject of a report just released by the Com- 
missioni/ and will provide the basic design for an extended 
analysis of this program during the coming months. Our prelimi­
nary findings —  and some important results from other studies—*/— ■ 
suggest that a subsidy, going directly to low and moderate-income 
households rather than to the developers and owners of low income 
housing units would provide much greater choice to the individual 
household and accomplish other important objectives as well.
Proposed federal legislation for a program of this kind is 
nent. it is important that this legislation, in its progress
1/ Housing for Low and Moderate-Income Families; The Failure of 
Present Programs, A proposed New Approach and the Issues It 
Raises, Sept. 1971, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland
**/ See, for example, the Rand Institute's excellent study of New 
York, Rental Housing in New York City, Vol. II, The Demand for 
Shelter, Ira S. Lowry, Joseph S. DeSalvo, and Barbara M. 
Woodfill, N. Y. City Rand Institute, June 1971.
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through the Capitol Hill grinder, not lose sight on that funda­
mental purpose of improving housing choices for the poor. The 
City Planning Commission intends to be prepared for those hearings 
and will argue forcefully for such a program through the Mayor's 
office, Cleveland-Area U. S. Congressmen and other prospective 
advocates for the program.
in the interim, the Planning Commission stands forcefully in 
support of present programs for low and moderate-income housing 
and for the distribution of low-income housing in all suitable 
locations of the City and region.
Part of this concern was expressed in a New-Town proposal for 
865-Acres of City-owned land located east of Cleveland.-^/ The pro­
posal, now pending before H.U.D., calls for the implementation of 
innovative programs in health, education and general services as 
well as the allocation of 2,800 of the 8,000 total dwelling units 
planned for low and moderate-income families.
Delivery of City Services —  The City Planning Commission has 
charter responsibility for preparation of a capital improvement
Î/ Pre-Application Proposal for Warren's Ridge New Town, City Plan1 
ning Commission, Cleveland, Ohio, February, 1971.
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program. This year a substantial change was made in a document 
which had become widely known as the "wish book." Essentially, the 
Planning Commission admitted that the document has no real affect 
on allocation of capital funds, articulated the reasons for this, 
and directed this year's document to a discussion of this central 
issue as well as a number of other important issues surrounding 
our investment in, use of and maintenance of municipal capital 
facilities.^/
In addition to our charter responsibilities with respect to 
capital improvement programs, the staff has been importantly in­
volved in analysis and recommendations concerning the operation 
and management of city line departments. This activity has two 
related purposes. First, we are concerned about the quality of 
municipal services, particularly as it affects the demand for hous­
ing and related use in the various neighborhoods of the City. 
Improvements in the quality of service, however, cannot at this 
time be expected to come about through the availability of new 
revenues but must be sought through changes in management and 
procedures given existing levels of financing.
*/ Capital Improvement Program, 1972-1977, July, 1971, City 
Planning Commission, City of Cleveland.
1
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At the same time, it w i U  greatly assist us in the long ih^ n 
if we are able to place, or train through example, individuals
\
every operating department of the city who have management or 
planning experience and the perspective that implies. This we 
hope to accomplish by analysis of, and recommendation for changes 
in, the operating procedures in departments along with key person­
nel of that department.
A good example of this is our work with the Division of 
Waste Collection and Disposal. As a result of an analysis com­
pleted by the Planning staff,t/ a City-wide task force was es­
tablished, a federal grant was secured, and work is now underway 
on a management study of this division with a view to making our 
expenditures in that function more efficient. Pour million dollars 
of local bond funds matched with federal funds will implement the 
recommendations of the study. We expect to save millions of 
operating dollars annually as a result of these capital expendi­
tures while improving the services of that division considerably. 
The Division of Waste Collection and Disposal is now administering 
that study and planning staff assigned to that project are now 
working with the Health Department in the same kir»d of effort with 
the same expected outcome.
- ' - ' -.'Jni L ' -"I ■ T - T' I NÎ/ Urban Solid Waste Collection and Disposal in the City of Cleve­
land, ^§rch 1971, City planning Commission, City of Cleveland.
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Transportation for the Poor —  The results of our efforts in some 
areas of concern are not easy to see - no report has been pub­
lished,—^ no physical or administrative changes have been made, or 
no legislation has been introduced or passed through channels.
This is a characteristic of our involvement and influence in the 
area of transportation. Some months ago a task force was estab­
lished to complete a study of public transportation needs in the 
metropolitan area and develop a plan for investment in public 
transit facilities. The Planning Director of the City of Cleve­
land was on that task force.
In the deliberations of that task force about the kind of 
study to be accomplished, the direction of the study and the con­
sultants to be selected for various parts of the study, the 
Planning Director's consistent and forceful emphasis on the needs 
of those among us who have no choice but public transportation has 
assured that attention will be paid - at least in the study phase - 
to that group which deserves priority in transportation subsidy.
This position has led to some conflict between the City and 
the Seven-County Planning and Review Agency anxious to assert
Though the study has not been completed, a paper setting forth 
the Planning Commission's position with respect to the trans­
portation needs of the poor has been published: "Transportation
and Poverty," General Plan-Transportation Paper #2, City Plan­
ning Commission, City of Cleveland.
l//;
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"regional" considerations. But, as in all things, conflict is 
not to be avoided. Rather, its basis must be made apparent, so 
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In the beginning, the American city was compact, its form de­
termined by the distance a man could walk to and from his home to his 
work. Later, the form was star-shaped, distended along trolley and 
railroad lines where new development took place clustered within 
reasonable walking distance from the stations. Finally, in the years 
following WW II and continuing through the present, the city virtually 
exploded with its components scattered, to the four winds and to 
a multiplicity of individual jurisdictions in every metropolitan area.
I do not think we can recapture the compact city.
The reasons for these changes in American urban form are not 
difficult to identify. They have mainly to do with rising family 
incomes, weak or non-existent land use controls in the developing 
urban fringe, FHA insurance policies and technological changes.
The most significant of these technological changes have been the 
availability of the automobile and the high-speed highway. With
a good car and a good road, locational choices become virtually 
unlimited. Those of us who have been able to take advantage of 
our automotive civilization have enjoyed the benefits of mobility 
and choice unprecedented in human history.
But while most of us were enjoying this mobility, the mobility 
of those who lack regular access to a car was suffering both in 
absolute and relative terms. There is no question but that the 
national majority which has opted for our automotive civilization, 
has not only injured the minority but has tended to ignore the 
problems it creates for those who do not have a car or those who 
cannot drive. As highways and cars have proliferated, and homes 
and destinations have scattered, ridership on conventional transit 
has sharply declined, fares have been increased and service has 
been cut. For the transit-dependent rider, there are fewer and 
fewer destinations he can reach at higher and higher prices. CTS, 
for example, runs about 200,000 bus miles less in 1970 than it ran 
in 1960 for double the fare. It is ironic; at a time when the 
central issue of American domestic politics is equality, public 
programs overwhelmingly cast in favor of the automobile by our 
federal highway policies has opened an ever-widening "mobility gap" 
between those who have and those who lack a car.
Those who cannot achieve "automobility" are a substantial group 
indeed, especially in the central city. They include the poor, the
3elderly, and those too young or infirm to drive. In the City of 
Cleveland, we estimate that 32 percent of all households (about 
79,000 households) do not own a car; that of the 46,000 Cleveland 
families with annual incomes under $5,000, 46 percent own no car; 
that 48 percent of all households headed by persons over 65 have 
no car.
It seems to me - in the name of simple justice - that it is 
this group which must be the prime beneficiary of improvements in 
transportation policy. It is no stretch of the imagination to 
state that those people who depend on mass transportation for their 
mobility have been "injured" by the national decision to opt for an 
automotive civilization, and deserve compensation much in the same 
way that those whose homes are taken by a highway are compensated.
Clearly, the broad objective of an equitable transit policy 
must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those prevented 
by extreme poverty, old age or physical disablement from moving 
freely about the metropolitan area.
Just as it is clear that those who depend on transit for their
only mobility demand highest priorities in transit policy, so is it 
clear that present transit policies serve other objectives almost 
exclusively. The main beneficiaries of today's transit subsidies 
and most subsidy programs now proposed are the more affluent riders
of transit and the mass transportation institution itself —  not 
the transit-dependent riders. This is true from the top - the $3.2 
billion available in the Federal Aid Mass Trains it Act which has not 
been earmarked for people subsidies but for capital grants and 
advanced acquisition of rights-of-way for new or extented rail 
systems, to the bottom - the flat fare rates which discriminate 
against the poor.
In the Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia areas, the most heavily 
subsidized transit riders have been the affluent patrons of commuter 
railroads. In our own area, the flat-fare structure on the Shaker 
Rapid produces a cost of 50<r from the Terminal to the E. 55th Street 
inner-city stop, and the same cost from the Terminal to Green Road 
in Shaker Heights, a ride about as far apart in distance as in 
economic status. The much-heralded Bay Area Rapid Transit system - 
which will require a projected annual subsidy roughly twice total 
fare box revenues - is designed to bring people from well-to-do 
suburban areas to the commercial cores of San Francisco and Oakland. 
The line has no extensions into North Beach or Chinatown - the 
poorest and highest density neighborhoods in San Francisco. This 
criticism is more-or-less applicable to the dozen or so new rapid 
transit systems now under consideration in metropolitan areas 
around the country - in Washington, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh. Each 
requires large subsidies and confers the lion*s-share of its 
benefits on middle- and upper-income riders.
4.
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We hear proposals to expand the transit system. If our purpose 
is to improve the mobility of the elderly, the poor and the disabled 
who are concentrated in the central city, how will the extension of 
steel rails into low-density, wealthier suburbs accomplish this?
If the answer to this question is: 'We must bring the poor close to 
job opportunities which are decentralizing' is it not more reason­
able to move the residences of the poor close to these jobs and 
dispense with the expensive, new transit system?
We hear proposals from time to time to make all public transit 
free. How would this sort of proposal benefit the transit-dependent 
rider in relation to costs? A recent analysis of a free-transit 
proposal in Boston pegs the annual cost of the program at 
$75 million. Beneficiaries however, include a large percentage of 
people who are neither poor nor dependent on transit, while those 
dependent on transit would not necessarily receive any improvement 
in service. On the other hand, if the program were properly 
directed by specific purpose, the cost of tripling transit service 
to and from Boston's poverty areas would cost only $4.3 million 
less any fare-box revenues received.
If the primary direction of transit subsidies should be - as 
I obviously believe - focused specifically on the needs of the 
transit-dependent population, it follows that subsidies should be 
channeled to particular users of transit systems rather than to the 
systems themselves.
) ô (
How can transit best serve this specific objective?
First, let me include in my definition of transit everything 
from buses, to taxis, to job jitneys, to car-pools to rail rapid 
transit.
Second, let me state that we tend to over sell the ability of 
transit alone to accomplish a massive diversion of commuters from 
their cars. I see a strong case for improving the quality of the 
rail transit system we already have in half a dozen cities, and for 
extending the lines in a few cases. But the case for new rail 
systems now being made in many cities strikes me as singularly weak.
Finally, let me state that urban transit has four critical needs 
in the current era: money, research, testing and managerial innovation. 
Until the first is confronted squarely, little progress is likely to 
be made with respect to the latter three.
It seems clear that mass transportation in the public interest 
cannot operate solely out of the fare box. Mass transit can make 
a profit if it deals only with peak-hour demand and the most heavily 
travelled routes, but this approach to scheduling will injure 
precisely that group which has the strongest claim to transit 
improvement. We cannot allow that to happen. Rather, we must insist 
that the funds needed to supplement the fare box in the interest of
7.
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the transit-dependent population come at least partially from the 
Highway Trust Fund which has indirectly restricted their mobility.
With this in mind, I hope that very soon we will see a trans­
formation of the Highway Trust Fund into a combined Transportation
would be in keeping with trends in the system of highway financing 
which are progressively broadening within an ever more-comprehensive 
framework. This change would allow local officials to budget a por­
tion of their transportation aid apportionments for transit purposes. 
To control misallocation of these funds, a heavy proportion of these 
funds would have to be specifically earmarked for direct subsidies 
to the transit-dependent rider, much in the way education funds are 
earmarked for poverty areas tinder Title II of the Federal Education 
Act.
Now how can we deal with possible ways of administering 
subsidies to make fine distinctions among transit users.
One method, already wisely in use in some cities, is the use of 
identification cards to those eligible for reduced fares such as 
the elderly and school children. It would be relatively simple to 
issue similar identification cards subject to a means test to those 
qualified for special subsidized fares as a result of low income or 
special physical disabilities.
Trust lund as a single system of transportation finance. This
A less complicated method which would do away with many 
identification cards would be to charge reduced transit fares for 
trips beginning or ending in a specified poverty zone. These would 
have to be supplemented, however, with special cards to identify 
the aged and disabled living outside the poverty areas.
An alternative way of specifically subsidizing the transit- 
dependent population would involve putting as much fare collection 
as possible —  for rich and poor alike —  on a charge basis. 
Everybody's charge card would look the same but some users - those 
qualified by low income or physical disability or age - would 
receive a discount on their monthly bill. If the reporting of 
income and other data were accurate - which could be assured by 
computerized cross checking of income tax returns - the subsidy 
could be varied according to the specific characteristics of each 
family.
In terms of system modification, I believe the greatest poten­
tial for serving the needs of the transit-dependent population and 
perhaps the entire future of transit lies in new systems such as 
the Dial-A-Bus which utilize cars and buses and offer door-to-door 
pick up and delivery with fare schedules automatically adjusted by 
computer. Such a system is in development at M.I.T. But we should 
not overlook the broadened use of taxi or jitneys - with or without 
sophisticated scheduling and control devices. As a matter of fact,
/of
taxi cabs could now provide much of the needed service, were it not 
for franchise restrictions and prohibitions on group fares.
Let me conclude, by briefly summarizing my recommendations:
1. The primary aims of transit policy should be to 
enhance the mobility of those who cannot drive and 
those who cannot afford automobile ownership. In
my judgment,, this is the only group that has a strong 
case for transit subsidization.
2. The most compelling argument for transit subsidies 
is that the national majority while opting for an 
automotive civilization has unwittingly caused
a reduction in the mobility of the non-driving 
minority.
3. The predominant form of transit subsidy should be 
reduced fares to needy individuals rather than 
grants to support whole services.
4. The main source of subsidies should be transportation 
user charges —  that is, highway user tax payments 
plus the fares of unsubsidized tramsit patrons - 
rather than general tax revenues.
I may have stated some ideas this evening which disagree with 
some of your judgments. This does not disturb me. What is vital is 
that those with policy responsibility begin to take fresh looks at
/0 S"
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their own preconceptions, at the arguments of their critics and 
at the unconventional ideas just visible over the horizon of 
feasibility. If I have stimulated even a few of you to undertake 





  Experience  with  regional  agencies  has  been  disappointing  –  Cleveland  policy  is  to  expand 
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AREAWIDE HOUSING POLICY: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES
by Norman Krumholz
Director, Cleveland City Planning -Commission
for the Annual Meetingof the American Society for Public Administration, 
Housing and Areawide Policy Session
New York City, March 23, 1972 y
When I joined the Cleveland City Planning Commission in 1969,
I was anxiety-ridden but optimistic about the prospects, fojç de­
veloping an areawide housing program to which the city might make
a contribution. I disagreed with those who were skeptical that
>..., ' ,• » - ■.
areawide housing policy could have as its primary-goal not merely
*' -  • • ' r .. ....
more housing starts but the provision of many 'more housing choices 
in the entire region for the poor and near-poor. I suggested that 
the skeptics dismissed too lightly the egalitarian nature of 
American ideals, the weight of recent legislation and the increas- i ,. 
»ng use of federal grant programs to induce areawide planning arid 
development. . *
Now, two and one-half years later, I am still anxiety-ridden but 
my optimism is waning. I see a small record of achievementy one 
suourb contiguous to Cleveland has actually built some housing 
for low-income families and another is talking about the possibi­
lity of public housing for the elderly.
similar attempts in other areas. The many jurisdictions in metro­
politan areas have all the legal weapons they need to "protect" 
themselves against any change in the status quo. They have a hous­
ing "policy" although it is unwritten: it is to resist. There is 
no other consensus on areawide housing objectives. This is parti­
cularly true when an essential goal of housing policy is, as it 
has been in our case, the expansion of regional housing oppor­
tunities for the poor and near-poor. We might have been more
»
successful with proposals for higher housing densities in the 
region or planned unit developments, but it has been our insistence
upon equity which has provided the focus for resistance.
}
This should surprise no one. Although equity as a goal has strong 
support in federal regulations and in political rhetoric, it has 
never received much attention either in the formulation of area- 
wide- policies or in metropolitan reorganization. Our attempts to 
resolve the problems of our metropolitan areas have uniformly 
concentrated on service and the ease of administration rather than 
on considerations of equity.
The park districts, sewer and water districts, stadium and trans­
portation authorities which abound on the metropolitan scene were 
neither conceived nor constructed in terms of equity. These 
entities were developed solely on the basis of the need for service
and efficiency. But the promise of efficiency says nothing about 
the appropriateness of policy nor about the relevance of program, 
nor about the incidence of benefits and costs to different economic 
groups in the region. One who seeks elements of equity in such 
bodies will be disappointed.
Our contentment with service and efficiency answers to metropolitan 
problems presents us with major difficulties when we try to frame
tareawide housing policies based on equity.
—  By concentrating attention on functional needs and 
organizational efficiency, we have assiduously avoided 
the deeper and more controversial questions of areawide 
policy including low-income housing distribution, racial 
assimilation, economic segregation and fiscal inequali­
ties.
—  By retaining local governmental autonomy and direct 
control through referendum elections at the local 
level, we have assured the perpetuation of "communi­
ties of limited liability" possessing a powerful inertia 
which supports the status quo, with its severe oppor­
tunity imbalance.
—  By supporting numerous units of local government all 
based on the image of the homogeneous residential
neighborhood we have divorced resources from responsi­
bilities and rights from duties. Further, we have 
practically guaranteed that neither the local govern­
ments nor the consensus upon which they rest will 
support housing ventures based on region-wide oppor­
tunity. Moreover, as our experience in Cleveland in­
dicates we have helped produce a situation where some 
local governments can and will block the efforts of 
others to develop equitable areawide housing policies.
It seems clear that areawide housing policies designed to increase
choices for low- and moderate-income families throughout the
>
region are unlikely to emerge from the efforts of local govern­
ments. As we have seen, local governments act with vigor to 
obstruct equity-based regional housing programs, and power clearly 
lies with those who would insulate themselves against equity.
The "urban county" approach also seems unlikely to produce equity- 
based policies in housing. While the county may satisfy some of 
the demands for "stop-gap" measures such as contracturai cost­
cutting services among local units, it retains the individual 
nuclei of resistance to equity-based schemes.
Similarly, such policies are unlikely to emerge from areawide agen­
cies such as councils of government or regional planning agencies
9
which conceive their responsibilities as limited to programs of 
efficiency. Rural and suburban officials perceive areawide 
agencies as a threat to local autonomy and act defensively, while 
central-city officials fear that these agencies may come between 
them and the higher levels of government on which they count 
heavily for aid.
Perhaps more equity-based planning and programming activities in 
housing will be forthcoming from areawide agencies in the future. 
That, however, depends on the willingness of the federal government 
—  specifically HUD —  to use the fiscal inducements of its grant
programs on a much broader and more-coordinated scale in behalf of
/
equity than it has to date.
If local governments, areawide agencies and even such governmental 
rearrangements as metro or urban counties are unable to base plan­
ning and programming on equity considerations, are we left to 
presume that there is no remedy in our country for the millions of 
Americans who live in dilapidated, inadequate, unsafe housing? Is 
there no remedy for this imbalance of opportunity?
I think there is. I see the federal and state governments filling 
the necessary role of balancer. Local governments, which are 
closest to the people in theory, have not been so in fact —  at 
least not to the nation's wretchedly housed or racial minorities.
- 10
are often closer to the federal establishment than to City Hall.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has put it well:
Local government is characteristically the govern­
ment of the locally powerful, not of the locally 
powerless; and the best way the locally powerless 
have found to sustain their rights against the 
locally powerful is through resort to the national 
government . . . .  The growth of national power, 
far from producing government less "responsive to 
the individual person," has given a majority of 
Americans far more dignity and freedom than they 
could win in a century of localism.
Those who live in our ghettos, barrios and rural poverty pockets
Equity in housing-choice opportunities has advocates —  however 
reluctant at times: the federal, and increasingly, the state govern­
ments. The federal government has both the necessary vision (as 
evident in HUD and Civil Rights regulations) and the essential 
money necessary to support or induce equity in housing opportuni­
ties .
I would like to endorse two specific programs which seem capable 
of promoting region-wide equity in housing choices. The first of 
these is a proposal for massive reform -- total reform in U. S. 
housing policy. The plan depends heavily on incentives provided 
by federal subsidies to the private market. The second lies in the  ^
establishment of new state entities.
First, I propose the enactment of a National Allowance Program 
to aid low and moderate-income households. This program would
11
provide large-scale money support for housing. Decent housing 
would then be within the financial ability of each household in 
the United States. Such a program might utilize a sliding-scale 
based on economic conditions of each region to relate the amount 
of the housing allowance to the living standards (and housing 
costs) of the region.
For example; in the city of Cleveland in 1969, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics has set the moderate standard of living budget for 
a family of four at $10,453, and the moderate housing cost at 
$1,662 or 15.8% of the total budget. The 15.8% housing expendi­
ture would be applied to all four-person families with incomes/
below the moderate standard of living level. Thus, a family with 
an income o.f $5,000 would receive an annual housing allowance of 
$362 which would represent the difference between 15.8% of their 
income, or $790, and the moderate standard of living housing 
cost of $1,662.
M.
In each region, every household with less than the "moderate level 
of income" would be eligible. This would include poor individuals 
and childless couples as well as families. At long last, we will 
be addressing the housing needs of all Americans of low- and 
moderate-income, rather than just that small percentage able to 
take advantage of the few low-rent units available. And these
12
needs will not be held contingent on "cooperation agreements," 
political subterfuge or housing authority boards hostile to their 
own responsibilities.
Let me sketch some of the administrative details. An eligible 
household would apply for the allowance and furnish evidence of 
its income. An annual income report would be required. An 
eligible household would be issued its Housing Allowance in the 
form of a check.
Tenants occupying housing units in compliance with local housing 
codes would simply endorse the check and turn it over to the 
owner along with whatever cash is required to^over the rent.
In the event the tenant occupies a substandard unit, the housing 
allowance is not sent to the tenant but held in trust, in the 
tenant’s name, until such time as the household occupied a unit 
in compliance with the codes.
«L
The accumulation of ear-marked housing allowance in this way will 
be a means of capital formation for the poor and those of moderate- 
income. A person would be free to choose to occupy a substandard 
unit for a time in order to accumulate a trust fund sufficient 
for a down payment on the home which would otherwise have remained 
forever beyond reach.
13
Owners occupying standard units and qualified by income would 
receive the full amount of the allowance in the same way as tenants, 
but owners occupying units not in compliance with local codes would 
receive no allowance. A subsidiary trust would be established, 
however, as part of this program to guarantee the availability of 
credit at reasonable interest rates to the eligible owners of sub­
standard housing on the condition that future allowances will be 
used to repay the loans necessary to bring the dwelling up to 
standard condition.
In all cases, the rent certificates or checks would be endorsed
by the occupant of a standard unit and subsequently endorsed by;
tne owner. Only the latter may negotiate the rent certificate
for cash at offices of the local public agency or delegated banks.
;
Here are some of this program's anticipated benefits:
—  By increasing the buying and negotiating power of all
i
poor and moderate-income families while making sub­
sidies conditional on residence in standard housing, 
we will benefit from powerful market forces in the 
upgrading of existing units and the construction of 
new homes.
—  The dwelling-places of the poor will no longer be set
apart from the balance of the community.
- 14 -
—  All poor and moderate-income families (not just those
for whom public housing units happen to be available) 
will receive help, with the poorest receiving the 
greatest subsidies.
—  Incentives will be established to assure owner and/or
tenant cooperation in maintaining decent homes at 
prices occupants are willing and able to pay.
—  Most importantly from the standpoint of areawide housing
policy, poor and moderate-income families will be 
able to choose housing in any jurisdicition and in 
any location.
s  A federal housing allowance program as described would do much to 
insure that all Americans could afford standard housing. It would 
also provide for some increase in areawide housing choices for 
low-- and moderate-income families. It would not, however, 
necessarily overcome the persistent phenomenon of racial resi- 
dential segregation.
To open our communities to all races, the state government must 
play an important role, probably along the lines of a state 
development corporation based on that devised by New York State. 
The corporation's first objective would be housing for low and 
moderate-income families in a wide range of locations
15 -
with insistence on open occupancy conditions. The corporation 
could also develop community facilities and industrial projects.
It would have broad powers of eminent demain, and would be em­
powered not only to plan for the property it acquires but to 
develop the land through all stages including management. The 
agency would have statewide jurisdiction and would not be governed 
by local land-use controls or zoning ordinances but only by the 
state's own building code.
The establishment of such a state agency under a clear equity 
mandate would weaken the power of local governments to block
federally-assisted housing of all kinds through large-lot zoning
>
and other manipulations of local ordinances. It would make clear 
that we cannot simultaneously enjoy the benefits of large-scale 
housing production based on egalitarian considerations, while 
allowing fragmented land-use policies by hundreds of tiny com­
munities locked in fiscal competition and planning only to avoid - 
not facilitate - change.
Though New York State has already vested power in this kind of 
agency, I am frankly not optimistic about its chances in other 
states. Most state constitutions are uniformly more restrictive 
than facilitative, and constellations of power in the form of 
lobbies tend to exert more weight at the state level them at other
— .16
levels of government. Even in New York State, consistent efforts 
by UDC to promote housing choices for low-income families in 
suburban areas may undermine its freedom to act, as a rural and 
suburban-dominated state legislature may constrict its operations. 
The same, of course, is true of HUD on the national level as it 
attempts to impose sanctions in order to enforce its regulations 
in the face of political pressure. Yet, at this point in time, 
these seem to be our best options for equitable areawide housing 
policies.
The program I have proposed will be expensive and politically
difficult to develop. We have estimated that an adequately-funded
>
mousing Allowance Program will cost approximately $15 billion 
a year —  not only a substantial increase in our present commit­
ment to housing but a substantial redistribution of income in 
favor of the poor. The political difficulties of using govern­
mental bodies such as state UDC's to destroy residential racial 
segregation argue for themselves. Yet, both are linked to an 
essential redistribution of income and power in this society which 
is overdue.
We can no longer avoid a redistribution of the resources 
of this society.
- 17 -
We can no longer accept subsidy to the richest among us 
and rhetoric for the poorest among us.
We can no longer believe in an equitable society with 
the evidence of inequity growing around us.
And we can no longer hope that equity will establish 
itself inevitably, without sincere efforts on 
our part.
I believe that state-wide and equity-based urban development
corporations and a national program of housing allowances are
steps in the right direction. Support for these programs will
involve us in conflict at all levels of government and frequent
/
disappointments.
Yet your group may be an important ingredient in ultimate success.









  Here  Krumholz  raises  the  question  to  the  American  institute  of  Planners  at  their  annual 
meeting: Can Advocacy Planning Survive?  For he has found that traditional planning respond 
adequately  to  persistent  poverty  and  racism.  He  then  shows  how  it  has  been  possible  to 
generate support for redistributive policy in Cleveland and elsewhere. 
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PLANNING IN CLEVELAND; WORKING THE ADVOCACY.SIDE OF THE STREET
by Norman Krumholz, Director 
Cleveland City Planning Commission
for the
American Institute of Planners 
55th Annual Conference 
Boston, Massachusetts
October 11, 1972
I suppose most city planners have long since dismissed the 
question posed as the title of this session —  "Can City Planning 
Survive?" Of course^city planners can survive —  and prosper as well. 
For the last two decades —  at least —  this society has handsomely 
rewarded planners with positions of prestige and financial security 
in return for our land use plans, our zoning ordinances and our 
increasingly shrill cries of alarm at the deepening urban crisis.
When the local general fund has faltered in our support. Uncle Sam 
has hastened to sustain our income and status with 701 or Community 
Renewal Program grants.
The question, then, is not whether city planners can survive.
Surely this profession will endure. But can individual members of 
this profession survive who cast.the vision of a just society
1 M l ?and then work seriously and meaningfully toward that In
other words, can advocacy planners survive?
For those interested in the answer to this question, I bring
hesitant glad tidings and a glimmer of hope.
Three years ago I joined the administration of Mayor Carl B. 
Stokes as Planning Director, intent upon producing a general land use 
and public facilities plan for the City of Cleveland. In just a few 
short months, it became obvious to me^that accomplishment of this 
traditional planning exercise would be irrelevant if not counter-
cipal poverty, racism, crime, bad housing —  can-
productive. The elements of the urban crisis —  personal and muni-
U&V A  r«oW M l
l, 'BeaiiMf .alggnacion,
not be directly, nor meaningfully, attacked with the city planner's
traditional bag of tools.
We could have ignored this realization and plunged forward with 
an updated version of «wr 1949 Land Use Plan. instead, we began the 
first halting steps toward a new vision for Cleveland, new direction 
for our institutions, and a role for the planning agency worthy of 
our efforts and resources.
Thj® vision was simple, its ramifications were to be pro-
A
found :
that individuals choose their own goals, and the 
means to pursue those goals,
that institutions derive their legitimacy only 
insofar as they promote individual choice of 
goals and means,
3.
that institutions serve individual goals most when 
they promote wider choices in decisions made by 
individuals, and that this must then be the primary 
goal of institutions, and
that, in a context of limited resources, first and 
priority attention must be given to the task of 
promoting wider choices for those individuals and 
groups who have few, if any, choices.
The planning agency's role would be to offer information,
criticism and policy guidance to decision-makers consistent with
this «ôadSKU The goal we chose to support placed us in a clear 
*
advocate position in favor of those who have few, or no, choices.
Wi
Its successful pursuit will require no less than a fundamental 
A
redistribution of income and power in our society. But such a goal 
is not utopian, it is not radical, nor is it altrustic or benelovent. 
It is a familiar goal, rooted in the egalitarian ideals of our birth 
and growth as a nation. It is, ultimately, a just goal; one that 
seeks a society where equity is at least as important as efficiency.
Our own dedication to this goal is essentially ideological; it 
rests on our commitment to equity as an ideal and the consequent >
Jf i ) ( *  fitt& y h  * /  0Vvr w ts  /> r v r * r  / * / * ~ * y  / S ’* * * * - ,
belief that any step in the direction of the ideal is desirable.^
And, of course, ■cwiii.u'LJLCrt.'ea attention to this goal led us away from 
the traditional policies and practices of planning agencies.
kIn particular, our ^iofco 
that put the substantiaVcatoabilities of my staff in service
fe new role we assumed to promote
4 .
to those who need planners, not in service to those who have 
planners.
* not\in service to local governments whictf employ 
land ^se controls to exclude low-incomer housing 
from oii$: suburbs and harass development in our
central cities,
/not in service to private and public entrepreneurs
who have used urban renewal to materially reduce
\  /
the supply of\low-cost housing in American cities
\ *at a cost of more than thre^ billion dollars,
\ /\ 'not in service tq those whose "solution" to trans-
/portation problems\is to/propose increased mobility» r/for those with regular/access to a car at the expense\ •y  •of those with no car/\- the poor, inform, elderly and
/
young, J
and not in service to developers, banks and high-income
i \taxpayers in search of tax-shelter who gratuitously
develop and finance Section 2Ç6 housing where their
/financial interests are heavily^served while the 
low-income family's interests arevonly tenuously 
served/—  all at startling cost to \he public treasury, 
in ^ftort, not in service to the "havels” of our society,




Those who truly need p3
need planner
possess, are those who ar^, 
and powerless of ouif'’society.
Imply use planners, 
andvfche substantial talents planners 
in need of everything —  the poor
Bwte—■fchoce who-ireed planners arc— the one^ wllU 'pay"""fui— them-.—  
"Ä«d tf&jsst planners believe that advocacy planning is risky business, 
generating conflict with those powerful institutions and individuals 
with vested interest in the status quo. Sooner or later one has to 
eat. And every planner here knows the politics of agency survival. 
Those who pay for you can use you. Those who need you are second 
in line.
I do not wish to minimize this so-called "fact of life." I do 
want to reconsider this part of our conventional wisdom in light of 
my experiences in Cleveland for the past three years —  years spanning 
two administrations, one led by a black Democrat (Carl B. Stokes) the 
present led by a white Republican (Ralph J. Perk). During this time 
our agency has consistently worked the advocacy side of the street 
and, I believe, we have acquired greater influence, prestige and 
possibly^success with the passage of tim&
Let me note at the outset, that in advocating minority interests 
through agency efforts, there are two levels of engagement.
b .
First, reasonable discharge of 
%
professional respons ibilit|£$
■*iiuuld require that you understand the ramifications of pro-
posais made by you or by others before your planning commissions. 
Be responsible to the goal of equity in your analysis of these 
proposals. Ask whether the clear benefits of these programs go to 
those most in need or those least in need. Ask whether those who
are called upon to pay for these programs are those most able to
pay or those least able to pay. And finally, make the results of 
these analyses available to the planning commission and the public
4»at large, as well as^local decision-makers. This is surely a proper
tfJjui L planning agencies. It may be castigated as divisive, or A
negative (and very often will be by the media) but it can never be 
wrong.
The second level of engagement requires much greater technical 
competence in economics and cost-benefit analysis as well as a good 
deal of political finesse. Once you understand that given proposals 
lead away from equity, design alternatives where the clear benefits 
of the alternative programs do go to those most in need, and where 
those least able to pay do not pay most of the costs. Then, use 
your institutional and political role in the community to argue 
for these programs before local and federal decision-makers.
The staff of the Cleveland City Planning Commission operates on 
both of these levels. In so doing, we have developed the role of 
the planner in such a way as to be almost diametrically opposite to
7.
that envisaged in most formal conceptions of the planner's function. 
Rather than serving as technicians supplying dat^, for the pre­
existing preferences of p^1 j fwhici.....gqawfeuaaa hajsd in
ipofooke if1 tehey -«aiiiijL- at ull) ; we function whenever we can as . .
advocates for our own Some of our information and proposals^ '
are directed at the participants in political decision-making; much 
of it is directed through the media to the public at large. Some 
of it —  as in this paper —  is directed toward the profession. All




My experiences in engaging at these two levels of advocacy have 
been sometimes exciting, sometimes frustrating, occasionally surpris­
ing. Let me touch on some examples and indicate several principles 
which are emerging and are of importance to our success and survival 
as an advocate agency.
First, decision-makers often make their decisions on the basis 
of appallingly limited information. In a few cases, this may be the 
level of information they want. In most cases, they want more infor­
mation but cannot get it.
So there is a great demand for information among political
decision-makers that is often unfulfilled. Those conditions give the
is fM « ; I c i of 1)jt Oh**&f*U ki»y.
suppliers of information considerable influence upon the decision.^
Being clear about how any proposal affects the interests you are
advocating, and placing that information in the hands of decision­
makers with similar interests among their constituencies will lend 
great weight to your recommendation.
For example: a proposed interstate highway through the City of 
Cleveland promised great benefits in increased mobility for suburban 
residents at great cost to those in the path of that highway as well 
as to city taxpayers in general. An alternative, developed and 
advocated by the Planning Commission, is now being proposed by the 
City —  not only because the alternative minimizes displacement 
within the City, but because the devastation of the original proposal 
on a certain Roman Catholic parish was outlined in precise detail by 
our staff to an important local decision-maker. This relatively 
small bit of information offered to the right decision-maker at the 
right time was a crucial key in assuring some equity between the 
benefits to the suburbs and the costs to the City of the proposed 
highway.
In the same way, our staff analysis of Nixon's proposed Family
Assistance Plan .recommended modifications to increase Cleveland's
benefits received local support. We took great pains to point
A
out the benefits of such an income maintenance program to the non-
»S, «f iLt X > y /* ih r/-  ty* tr\ J*tA,f &
poorj^ I am convinced thus information contributed importantly to
endorsement of the proposal by our Chamber of Commerce as well as the
6L)approval of some local officials '«nia consequent support of FAP
via our U. S. Congressional delegation.
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A second principle is of crucial importance to those who deal 
with large legislative bodies elected on an area basis such as wards.
)*v Cltotjudi NM« C Î3  *M cUttfaj **  *-
Your constituency as represented by such a body will not remain
solid. Rather, the forces arrayed against your proposals will shift
in composition and size from issue to issue. This tends to discourage
consistent majority opposition to your proposals, discouraging as well
5c.Che..
coalitions of legislators in favor of your quick
Again, let me use local illustrations: the City Planning Commission
has consistently advocated public housing for low-income families 
throughout the City and in the suburbs as well. This position has 
been supported, by and large, by the councilmen from black wards and 
generally resisted by the councilmen from the white wards.
In another study, however, a routine staff evaluation of the 
capital needs of our municipal light plant led to the Planning Commis­
sion proposing the condemnation and acquisition of the private electric 
utility and the expansion of our small municipal power system into 
a city-wide network promising lower electric power rates, ter1 the lotwaifc
■ ( "like- )
^  ffon jimiiwij-n nynf r Qur antagonists and protagonists
in this issue are almost exactly flip-flopped from the public housing 
issue. Black councilmen, by and large, want to<<sell the municipal 
light plant to the private utility, not expand it. And the white 
councilmen most adamantly against public housing in their wards are 
most decidely in favor of our proposal to expand the municipal power
plant.
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A third principle relates to the incremental nature of political 
decision-making. Public policy moves forward slowly and carefully 
rather than boldly. Decision-makers who wish to change policy^move 
very carefully with a sharp eye to the breath of support and 
narrowness of opposition. Generally^they prefer to avoid commiting 
themselves to large-scale programs preferring feasibility in opera- 
tional terms to "fit" in any grand designs. But, as reluctant as 
decision-makers are to decide on large issues whose implications are 
unclear, still they must decide.
In this situation, advisors with an informed point of view can 
exert influence considerably out of proportion to their numbers.
Mayor Stokes felt he should do something about 800 acres of 
city-owned and essentially vacant land in a suburban township. His 
idea was to sell off the land and use the proceeds for redevelopment 
and rehabilitation in the various neighborhoods of the City. We 
persuaded him to let us plan a new town on the site. In six months, 
the Planning Commission completed a development plan and feasibility 
analysis which promised new choices in housing for low and moderate 
income families of the City^ the testing of new procedures for the 
delivery of essential public services^ as well as $750,000 annually in 
lease revenues to be used in the City. The Mayor supported the pro­
posal.
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When the business community came forth recently to offer a pro­
posal for a new jetport in Cleveland, the Administration of Mayor 
Perk was reluctant to support it because it was unclear how City 
interests were affected. The City Planning Commission quickly 
developed a 7-point list of conditions under which the City could 
enter into such an agreement. Included in the list were clear benefits 
to the City in the form of revenue flows and jobs for its unemployed 
citizens. The Mayor supported the proposal.
The Cleveland City Planning Commission has convinced both the 
Stokes and Perk administrations that transfer of our municipal bus 
and transit system should not take place without assurances that 
services to transit-dependent riders are improved, maintained and 
subsidized. Both Mayors felt the need for attention to the needs 
of those whose mobility depends entirely on public transportation, 
but it was the staff of the Planning Commission which developed the 
conditions under which transfer of our municipal system will take 
place.
In the same way, we have successfully influenced the course of . ,. .
\Wi, IvAVfr i r Ml
a study designed to produce a transit plan for our region^<aad* we will 
fight the use of federal subsidies in mass transit for extensions of 
existing systems into suburban areas at the expense of improvements
in service to the poor, elderly and infirm of the City.
12.t %
A fourth principle is one which all of you can surely appreciate. 
Political decision-makers rarely harbor articulate, consistent ob­
jectives. For those of you who look to political leaders for 
objectives, this is a very decided problem. For those of us who have 
objectives for which we are seeking clients this is a decided 
opportunity.
Let me use another example to illustrate this point.
A state highway threatens to decimate two neighborhoods on the 
Cleveland's near west side —  displacing over a thousand low to 
middle-income families, removing millions of dollars from the assessed 
valuation rolls of the City, and burdening the City taxpayers with 
millions of dollars for their share of the construction costs. Again, 
the benefits of this highway would accrue largely to suburban resi­
dents in reducing the time and congestion of their journey to work.
The objectives of many political decision-makers in this matter 
were not articulated, but much general dissatisfaction was apparent.
But the highway had been pending for ten years outlasting, in the 
process, several mayors and dozens of councilmen. The Planning Commis­
sion's objectives were to bring the relative costs and benefits of this 
highway into a more reasonable equilibrium. In so doing, the Commis­
sion provided a policy-framework which articulates the objectives and 
the time-frame which many political figures in two administrations 
both comprehend and support.
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Briefly, the City Planning Commission has refused to approve this 
highway. Our decision rule for the approval of all future highway 
"improvements" is that the City and its residents are not left worse 
off W-tk the "improvement" than before. Specifically, three conditions 
must be met;
1. The city will not be responsible for any share of 
the construction costs,
2. Displaced families will be relocated in units they 
can afford which are built substantially out of 
highway funds, and
3. The State will make an annual payment to the City 
to reimburse it for all lost tax revenues as a result 
of clearance for the highway rondtoeit.
Let me close by saying that I am beginning to think that all 
planning agencies in our older central cities should be, or will soon 
become, advocates for the "have-nots" of our society. Our moral 
commitment in Cleveland to what we have called "advocacy" is real*
But striking a consistent stance in favor of the "have-nots" is 
becoming more and more a matter of simply providing appropriate 
service to a majority of the residents in our older central cities.
The city is, after all, more than a collection of buildings, 
power elites and land uses. It is more than rich suburbanites and 
expatriate corporations. As Henry Churchill wrote, the city is the 
people, and they have real interests which must be served.
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It is relatively unimportant whether these interests are served 
in a planning or policy sense by people who operate out of the Mayor's 
office, or out of some executive agency such as an Office of Manage­
ment and Budget, or, propitiously, out of a ready-made outfit that 
already has the appropriate title of Planning. But if these interests 
are not served by City Planners —  if our profession fails to adapt 
to these needs —  if we continue with our traditional focus on land 
u,se, zoning and design, then city planning will indeed survive, but 
not as a significant force in solving America's urban problems.
We will survive like Yale's fabled Mory's^ The tables remain, 
but few can sit with ease. The glasses are raised, but not on high.
And voices joined will sing a tune that only few.recall. We will
A
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ADVOCACY PLANNING IN CLEVELAND
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Lecture by Norman Krumholz, Director 
Cleveland City Planning Commission 
at the Department of City and Regional Planning 
“University of California, Berkeley, California
October-10, 1973
Four years ago I joined the administration of Mayor Carl B. Stokes 
as Planning Director of the City of Cleveland. It is not clear whether 
Mayor Stokes had any idea of what to do with me at first, but the body 
to which I am officially responsible —  the City Planning Commission —  
had some very clear ideas on high-priority work assignments. One Com­
mission member (a planning professor interested in land use control) 
wanted a completely new zoning ordinance; another (a downtown business­
man) wanted a downtown-revitalization study; a third (a banker) thought 
that a study aimed at straightening out the winding Cuyahoga River 
would help straighten out the city's problems as well. For my part, 
my intent was to gather up all the resources at my command and plunge 
forward with a new long range land use plan.
Luckily, a few newly-hired statt members and I paused to look at 
the City of Cleveland and its people. What we saw caused us to question 
the relevancy of traditional American planning practices. We saw an 
old industrial city whose population was declining rapidly as was its 
share of the regional economy. We saw neighborhoods whose housing 
stock had deteriorated to the point a.t which disinvestment and 
abandonmfent had become commonplace. We saw a blue-collar population,
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white and black, whose access to income and wealth was severely limited
UJi-fcfr ÿ'-MQ /eh * c
- a population in which the 1969 median household income was $7,100,„ 
a population in which 30% of all households had annual incomes of less
•kthan $5,000, a population in whichA79,000 households lacked the basic
v
mobility provided by an automobile. We saw an environment in which 
crùrié and racial hostility and segregation were dominant facts of 
life.
Having g wop1 n H  of that, it became obvious to us that development
of a comprehensive long range land use plan —  even a brand-new zoning
ordinance —  would be irrelevant if not actually counter-productive.
« •»
The elements of the urban crisis in Cleveland and in other older cities 
of this nation have little to do with land use or zoning* They have 
to do with poverty, racism, social alienation, crime and bad housing 
and they cannot be directly, nor meaningfully, attacked with the city 
planner's traditional bag of tools.
We could have ignored or suppressed this realization and proceeded 
toward an updated version of Cleveland's 1949 Land Use Plan, instead, 
we chose to address what we conceived to be the authentic needs of the 
city and its people. Our first halting steps led us toward a new 
vision for Cleveland, toward Advocacy of new directions for our 
institutions, and into a ra&e for the Cleveland Planning Commission 
worthy of our efforts and resources.
The vision, o,r our over-riding goal, is simple. It can be out­
lined quickly. The focus is not on patterns of land use but on 
individual opportunity and institutional responsibility:
Individuals choose their own goals and means to pursue 
those goals.
—  Institutions Vre established to serve individuals
in their pursuit of their own goals. In the process 
institutions, thtemselves, establish goals —  some of 
which must be selk-serving to assure their survival. 
Institutional goals which are self-serving, however, 
must be kept secondary to those which further the 
pursuit of individual goals.
Both individuals and institutions pursue their respec­
tive goals through decision and action. Decisions to 
act must be made from among those choices of action 
which the individual or institution perceives.
—  Individuals are better off wiüh more choices in any 
decision.
Institutions serve individual go^ls best when they 
enlarge the range of choices available to individuals.
—  Therefore, the primary goal of institutions through 
institutional actions must be to expahd the range of
choices available to individuals.
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In a context of^limited resources, institutions should
give first and priority attention to the task of pro­
moting wider choices for those individuals and groups 
who have few, if any àhoices.
The last point is the key. The advice, information and recommen­
dations offered by the Cleveland City Planning Commission would be 
directed primarily toward the accomplishment of this single, simply- 
stated goal:
Simple equity requires that locally-responsible govern­
ment institutions - with limited powers and resources - 
should give first and priority attention to the goal of 
promoting wider choices (more alternatives and opportuni­
ties) for those individuals and groups in the City of 
Cleveland who have few, if any, choices.
We are aware that this goal places us in a clear advocate position 
in favor of'those who have fewest choices. We understand that our 
position entails advocacy of a fundamental redistribution of income 
and power in our society. But we are convinced that such a goal is 
not utopian, it is not radical, nor is it altruistic, benevolent or 
charitable. It is a familiar goal that is thoroughly American and is 
rooted in the egalitarian ideals of our birth and growth as a nation.
It is ultimately, a just goal; one that seeks a society where equity 
is at least as important as efficiency.
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In these introductory remarks I have tried to establish the con­
cern for "advocacy" or "equity" which guides the day-to-day activities 
of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. I would like now to relate 
examples of our work and our operating style. Later, I will try 
ho elicit some useful observations from th*>S' examples*.
The first example has to do with housing one of the first issues 
we chose to address in Cleveland. There was general agreement among 
the Mayor, City Council and most city officials as to what the problem 
was: there was a scarcity of low- and moderate-income housing in the 
city. The remedy was uncomplicated and directs it was to build more 
subsidized housing wherever such construction was politically feasible.
My staff was not convinced. If conventional wisdom was correct, 
why were rents in Cleveland so low? And why were several neighborhoods 
in Cleveland showing clear signs of widespread abandonment? We decided 
to undertake a research effort aimed at casting more light on the issue 
by answering three basic questions: 1) what was the nature of the 
housing problem in Cleveland? 2) what had been the nature and effective­
ness of the public response to the problem? 3) what changes in public 
programs and policies would be needed to achieve a more effective 
response to the problem?
Tlie analyses aré now completed and are béing bound and published 
as the Cleveland Housing Papers. The collection is, xn my opinion, 
one of the finest series of analytical papers on housing ever done 
by a city planning agency.
The analyses argue forcefully that the conventional wisdom is 
incorrect, and that an alternative definition of the "housing problem" 
such as that advanced by Ira Lowry of the N.Y. Rand Institute, and 
Henry Aaron, of the Brookings Institution is applicable to the situation 
in Cleveland. No longer is there a scarcity of low income housing units. 
Because of sweeping population shifts and generally low income^ a surplus 
of low income units —  many of them substandard —  has been created.
The basic flaw in the conventional wisdom has been the assumption that 
the problem is a lack of housing when in truth it is a lack of income.
Our field survey found about 2,000 vacant and vandalized housing 
units in Cleveland, and we estimated that the rate of residential 
abandonment was averaging about three additional dwelling units a day.
We found that, because of low income, large numbers of Cleveland house­
holds simply could not afford standard housing; that owners were not
getting enough revenues to be able to maintain their buildings properly.. > *
We became increasingly convinced that the traditional of city
housing policy on new construction was untenable. We came to believe 
that the attention of City officials should be focused on saving the 
existing stock from the growing threat of deterioration and abandonment.
On the basis of this analysis, we arrived at a series of program 
recommendations :
First, that a strong Housing Allowance Program be made the 
cornerstone of federal efforts in the area of housing.
A Housing Allowance Program, providing assistance directly 
to qualified families for the rental of standard housing
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would address the heart of the housing problem -
, that improved code enforcement be undertaken in
those residential areas of Cleveland which are still
salvagable.
that $1.5 million of city funds be allocated
0
immediately for the demolition of vacant and vandalized 
housing
______that state codes and local procedures relating to
the condemnation of hazardous structures and the collection 
of tax-liens be substantially altered so that Cleveland might 
demolish abandoned structures more quickly and reqain its in­
vestment in demolition.
But the publication of these recommendations and of the Cleveland 
Housing Papers was not the end of our efforts. Far from it. Here 
briefly are some of our subsequent activities: We presented these
findings and recommendations to the City Planning Commission - and got
city officials on our program recommendations, and lobbied (with 
essential support from our friends in the press) for th^rnecessary
. damoli Lion . We asked for - and received - the Mayor's support
in lobbying for a Housing Allowance Program within the HUD Washington 
bureacracy. We have pursued such lobbying efforts with substantial 
vigor. We' contacted all of our area's U. S. Representatives and both
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Ohio Senators trying to get their support for a program of housing 
allowances. We wrote an article describing our study and its findings 
for the ASPO magaz'ine. We sent copies of the Cleveland Housing Papers 
to various academicians whom we hoped would support our argument, help 
us in further lobbying efforts with the HUD bureaucracy, and initiate 
lobbying efforts with their own area Congressmen.^ And we have armed 
the Mayor and members of our Planning Commission with testimony to 
present before Congressional Committees in support of housing allow-
r
ances when hearings ■’re held on £ew housing bills.
* , * *•
The record of our efforts is enuuuiay ifltj. The City Administration 
and City Council responded to our housing abandonment survey by accept­
ing our recommendations and allocating the full $1% million we requested 
for demolition of vacant, vandalized buildings. The prognosis for the 
other recommendations is reasonably hopeful. A Housing Allowance 
Program apparently will be included in a federal housing bill either 
amended into the present bill or in the next bill% R  good deal of
work has already taken place locally on reform of code enforcement and 
condemnation procedures within the.c.ity.
Rut,«ôÿbe more 'important, individuals with power and institutional 
responsibility are beginning to doubt the conventional wisdom in hous­
ing. People are changing their minds. Perhaps in some way we have 
helped change their minds.
The second example deals with transportation, a few weeks after 
I arrived in Cleveland, Mayor Stokes asked mg to jserye as his represen-
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tative on a City transit committee established to prepare a program 
and grant application for federal funds in support of the Cleveland 
Transit System. CTS, which is owned by the City, was (and is) suffer­
ing from the familiar ridership and revenue shortages that characterize 
public transit everywhere. A way had to be found simply to keep the 
system operating. Beyond that, no other objective was discussed in 
any clear way.
The Committee completed its work quickly and submitted its pro­
posal to the Department of Transportation. The people at DOT, anxious 
to assure comprehensiveness, told us to go away until we had a joint 
City-County proposal. We returned to our labors with some County 
officials added to our roster and, lo, just such a joint proposal 
emerged which we then brought back to DOT for approval.
But the federal agency still was not satisfied that the joint 
City-County proposal was sufficiently comprehensive; after all, parts 
of the larger region were urbanizing and our transportation proposals 
would have an impact there. So the joint City-County committee was 
reconstituted as a special subcommittee of our seven-county regional 
agency; the scope of the study was broadened from one to five counties 
and the study committee itself was broadened to 21 members of which 
the outlying four counties appoint one representative each, the busi­
ness community appoints two, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners appoint 
three, and the City of Cleveland appoints three.
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The new committee and study area were now sufficiently "compre­
hensive" to satisfy federal requirements. But somehow the goal of 
the committee was no longer simply to keep CTS running. We were now 
supposed to extend rapid lines, provide an attractive alternative to 
the automobile, unify and coordinate the 21 public and private transit 
systems in the region, build a downtown distribution system and to 
transfer CTS to some sort of regional agency which could use general 
tax funds to supplement farebox revenues. Once all of this was 
accomplished, the system's survival would be assured, and everybody 
would be happy. Or would they?
My staff and I were not convinced that the prospects were quite 
so bright. While these re-organizations were taking place, our first 
transportation study entitled Transportation and Poverty was published. 
Let me quote briefly from its findings:
\  "In the course of opting for an automotive civilization, we 
have provided unprecedented mobility for those who can take 
full advantage of it. But in the process, the national 
majority has chosen to ignore completely the problems this 
civilization creates for those who cannot drive or lack 
regular access to a car. As any resident of Cleveland can 
testify, if he is too young, too poor, too ill or too old 
to drive, there are fewer and fewer places he can reach by 
conventional transit. This is partly the result of the 
increased scatteration of new developments taking place at 
low densities impossible to achieve without the highway and 
the car, and partly because of service cuts by public transit 
brought on by decreasing ridership and revenues.
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue for an end to 
highway investment, but to attempt to modify and redress the 
impact of present regressive transportation policies on the 
poor, the elderly, the very young and the disadvantaged.
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This group is substantial, indeed. In 1966, 32% of all 
households, that is, about 79,000 households, in the City 
of Cleveland did not own cars. Of all families with annual 
incomes under $5,000 an estimated 46% owned no car. Of all 
households headed by persons over 65, 48% or approximately 
24,000 households owned no car.
In keeping with the Cleveland City Planning Commission's goal 
of improving choices for people who have few, it is morally 
imperative that this transit-dependent group be the prime 
beneficiary of changes in transportation policies. The over­
riding goal of transportation policy in the City of Cleveland 
must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those prevented 
by poverty or by a combination of modest income and physical 
disability (including old age) from moving freely about the 
metropolitan area."
Given the' goal of providing more choices ’to those wno have few, 
improved mobility for the transit dependent population had become the 
Cleveland City Planning Commission's prime transportation objective. 
Would the transfer of CTS to a regional agency automatically or 
necessarily serve that end? Would a downtown subway or suburban rapid 
extensions confer any benefits on the transit-dependent? Would improved 
funding be used to improve the mobility of the transit-dependent or 
would it provide more transportation choices to the suburban middle 
class? Would the 5-County Transit Committee with its business and 
regional political constituency, be overly concerned with the needs of 
a transit-dependent population which is largely confined to the City 
of Cleveland?
I would like to be able to answer these questions definitively, 
but after almost four years we are still in the process of finding out. 
Over that period my staff, myself and the Planning Commission have 
urgently and persistently stressed the plight of the transit-dependent
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population. If we were the ultimate decision-makers, the issue would 
be resolved; the politicians and local institutions with a stake in 
the issue, however, have been ambiguous in their support. What have 
we as planners done to assure proper attention to our point-of-view 
at decision-time?
As a planning professional, I have lobbied for emphasis on the 
- needs of the transit-dependent through brief^ingjwith the Mayor, City 
Council members and other local political figures. I have submitted 
papers at an AIP-DOT sponsored conference, at AIP and ASPO annual 
conferences and at two AIP Biennial Policy Conferences. I have been 
in constant touch with my opposite numbers in the DOT bureaucracy.
Key members of my staff have engaged in similar efforts.
The Cleveland City Planning Commission has been supportive in 
passing numerous resolutions stating and re-stating its concern for 
the transit-dependent, and setting conditions clearly beneficial to 
this group in any future transfer of CTS to a regional agency.
In my role as member of the Five-County Transit Committee, its 
Consultant Screening Committee, its Executive Committee and on the 
Board of the seven-county regional planning agency, I have pressed 
for proper recognition of the plight of the transit-dependent.
To some extent, our efforts have been successful. In its goal 
statement the 5-County Transit Study has recognized the improved
mobility of the transit-dependent as its highest priority. After much 
bargaining and committee in-fighting, we convinced the 5-County Study
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to select our candidates for prime contractor, for sub-contractor in 
the vital transit-dependent element of the plan and for project manager.
We have also fought for and won adequate funding for the transit-depen­
dent element of the study. We supported specific consulting organiza­
tions and individuals because they seemed conscious of the human problems 
of the transit-dependent while other firms and individuals seemed beholden 
to nothing beyond the standard civil engineering approach to transpor­
tation analysis. We have had some successes.
Yet, after all this effort, I am not overly-confident that the 
needs of the transit-dependent will be met in the end. The seven-county 
planning agency has announced, as its first transit proposal, support 
for a $10 million 1%-mile extension of the existing Shaker Rapid line 
from fashionable - and rich - Shaker Heights to fashionable - and richer 
- Pepper Pike. And the 5-County Transit Study has presented as 
its preliminary package, a series of high-priced proposals that under 
our analysis, appear to confer massive benefits on the rich and middle- 
class in the region while giving only token benefits to the transit- 
dependent population in the City.
But the game is not over. As professional long-term players, 
representing an important City agency, our point-of-view must be 
accommodated. If the business community is to get its downtown subway 
and the suburban politicos their rapid extensions, we are determined 
to get adequate attention to our transit-dependent clients. If we do 
not, we have made clear our intent to publicly and (loudly) defect and
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disavow the study, an action that could jeopardize the entire program 
when a tax issue is presented to the region's voters. By continuing 
to try to influence the study, the Mayor and other key decision­
makers, we may still exert enough leverage to win out after all.
These two examples are representative of many of the issues in 
which we are involved. What is it that they represent? What do they 
suggest about the operations of the Cleveland City Planning Commission 
which might be of some value to other planning agencies and the plan­
ning profession in general? Let me suggest a few lessons which might 
be derived from our experiences over the past four years in Cleveland.
First, we planners have been too timid. That criticism is pointed 
especially toward directors of planning agencies, who are the individ­
uals confronted by the challenge and the opportunity to create an 
activist role for their organizations. It must be understood that few 
people in', government understand just what it is /that city planners are 
supposed to do. Beyond the narrowly defined powers and responsibilities 
mandated to us by the City Charter, the scope of the planning function 
is not specified by law nor is it uniform by practice. Thus, we have 
great freedom to define our own roles and responsibilities. We cannot 
wait for decision-makers to define our roles; or to come in search of 
our "wisdom." They will rarely come to us; neither the law, nor custom 
nor their own political instincts will suggest that they do. If we are 
to be used, then, we planners must seize the initiative. We must 
develop the kinds of work programs and^analyses which are relevant to
Ü b  i e  Cr»
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political decision-making. We must bring our work to the attention of
1
decision makers and convince them of its worth.
Surely this course of action entails some risks, but it seems to 
me that the risks have been overly dramatized. As a profession, we 
have been too much concerned with job security and the limits of current 
American practice to be as useful as we might be in making things better 
for the people of the city.
Second, the initial - and essential - step toward developing an 
activist role lies in the adoption of a clearly-defined priority goal.
In the absence of such a goal, planning agencies have been unable to 
answer the basic question of how to allocate limited agency resources.
Why not re-write the zoning ordinance? Or study the straightening of 
the Cuyahoga River? Or design a co-ordinated container for street 
furniture? Why not simply replicate the replications of our predecessors? 
We have often resorted to focusing upon techniques^ applying the well- 
established tools of the trade merely because the tools are familiar 
and safe, not because such tools provide useful insights or solutions 
in problem areas.
In our Cleveland case, the goal of providing more choices to those 
individuals and groups who have few, if any, choices, has provided the 
needed direction for our activities. It has enabled us to select those 
issues upon which we have focused primary attention —  issues involving 
equity considerations. The goal has given clarity and power to our
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analyses, both in evaluating proposals set before us by others, and 
in developing policy and program recommendations of our own. Those 
essential questions which most planners never ask: "Who gets?" "Who 
pays?" have been key elements in our analytical framework. The goal 
has placed us in a position where we can seek out and identify clients 
for our work. Our allies are those who are concerned with improving 
the equity of a given situation or with improving the quality of the 
political process itself.
It will be noted that our goal is one which we virtually defined 
for ourselves. We had to. Those planners who, in the tradition of our 
profession, look to political leaders for clear statements of goals or 
objectives will be eternally frustrated. The political process is 
a decision process, not a process of goal development or analysis. 
Government officials persist in avoiding any close identification of 
goals or objectives. They must. The purposes of some programs are 
cynical; the objectives of many more are multiple, and the maintenance 
of disparate sources of support requires ambiguity. Moreover, men who 
run for public office know far more poignantly than we do the odds 
against actually achieving basic change. They know, therefore, that 
large promises made with specificity today may become proof of failure 
in two or four years. Yet Large promises must be made; but prudently 
kept vague. Thus, while the planning process, as we conceive it, demands 
that goals be clearly specified, the political process as we have 
experienced it, demands that goals remain ambiguous. Planners committed
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to adopting an activist role have little choice. The first, and 
perhaps the most important, initiative which they must take is that 
of developing a clear, goal-oriented perspective for themselves.
The third lesson derived from our experience deserves special 
emphasis. We have been concerned not merely with the adoption of 
a goal —  just any goal. Rather, we have been concerned with the 
adoption and pursuit of a very specific goal, a goal to which we are 
personally and professionally committed - the goal of trying to create 
a more just society. Our goal has placed us in a clear advocate posi­
tion on behalf of those less favored by present social and economic 
conditions. it is obvious that the less favored are neither the more 
powerful nor, in many cases, the more numerous in our city, region or 
country. Yet, bast<4 upon our experience in Cleveland, it seems clear 
that for planners to adopt equity as their overriding goal is both 
a reasonable and a defensible position.
The criticism most often leveled against our approach is that our 
goal is too "ideological." But, being "ideological" hardly constitutes 
a radical departure from traditional planning practice. Behind most 
planning perspectives there lies some basic ideological committment —  
often to aesthetics, or beauty or efficiency or to that most grandiose 
of ideological icons - the value of real property. Ironically, although 
we in Cleveland are often faulted by fellow planners for being advocates, 
planners have always been advocates - for themselves, for their values,
for the city's business interests and for the middle or upper classes
of their communities.
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But given the environment in which we workman environment marked 
by deteriorating inner city neighborhoods and burgeoning suburban 
subdivisions, by vastly expanded mobility for those with automobiles 
and significantly diminished mobility for the transit-dependent —  an 
environment characterized by massive inequalities in the distribution 
of income and power, what more appropriate ideological commitment 
could planners make than a commitment to equity?
If our logic will not convince you of the appropriateness of our 
goal, perhaps our record will. In four years, under two mayors who 
could not be more dissimilar —  a Black, Liberal Democrat, and a white. 
Conservative Republican —  our agency has steadily acquired greater 
influence, prestige and success.
My fourth observation, is that pursuit of a goal such as equity, 
requires that planners focus their attentions upon the decision-making 
process and focus on it with hard, relevant information. Important 
decisions effecting society are made. byt politicians, administrators 
and private entreprenuers, not by planners. But it has been our 
experience 9 that planners can have a significant impact upon the 
decisions made by others if they bring an information dimension to 
that decision.
\
In its role as an '«activist"agency, the Cleveland City Planning 
Commission develops policies anà programs and works with decision­
makers to secure their implementation. This requires foresight. What 
are the key issues coming up? What institution is empowered to decide
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whether a program foill be approved? Who are the key actors? Who may 
influence them? WheVi will the decision be made? What information is 
likely to be relevant to those who decide? How muchwill the program 
cost? How will the expenditure benefit the residents of Cleveland^ 
What are unintended but probable side-effects? In this situation, the 
planning director and senibr staff must make judgments concerning 
issues and problems which m^y reach legislative form in the next six 
or twelve months. They must predict who will decide on what issue and 
they must program staff time äfcid resource^for efforts designed to bring 
information and analysis to bear on the problem. They must develop the 
program that the Planning Commission will support during discussions 
prior to decision. They must seelé support for the program among those 
who will ultimately decide. All o£ this takes time and attention; and 
it is not always successful. But, s\nce influencing decisions is the 
only means we have for affecting our gtoal, all of this, and possibly 
more, is required.
In Cleveland we have discovered that our power to influence 
decisions is directly related to our professional competence. Our 
program analyses and recommendations are informed both by our point of 
view and by our technical expertise. They are not based on liberal 
rhetoric or our own "feel" of an issue. Political decision-makers are 
uninterested in hearing more of the standard rhetoric from the left or 
the right, and their political "feel" is lots better than ours.
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The understanding of problems and the presentation of policies 
and programs to the Mayor, Councilmen and other key political and 
business figures requires staff with basic, critical skills and 
abilities. Ability to deal with voluminous statistical information, 
familiarity with both public and private financial practices and 
techniques; an understanding of basic economic precepts, a working 
knowledge of the law and appreciation of the rules of bureaucracies 
are crucial characteristics'of staff engaged in this work. More often
ß
than not, the successful advocacy of ^ dqsirable program or legislative 
change will rely entirely upon the quality of staff work involved* . 
Certainly the only legitimate power the Commission can count on in these 
matters is the power of information, analysis and insight they bring to 
bear. But that power is considerable when harnessed to authentic con­
ceptualizations of public need. If you are interested in affecting 
outcomes, then, vision, energy and expertise are essential
to have any substantial impact upon decision making. Planners must be
prepared to stay put and use all their resources in fighting for their
efadfr'Ji fPOWiltobjectives. The transit and heuoing. examples related earlier cover 
a span of about four years. Just now the critical decisions are being 
made on the elements of the transit service package which will be pre­
sented to the voters for approval, and they are very large decisions 
indeed. If the planners involved in this issue had played their usual 
game of two-years here^ then off to another agency, we would be in no 
position to influence this decision whatever. Some considerable con­
tinuity is needed.
There is yet another ingredient which
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Permit me a couple of closing observations. If we planners want 
to treat urban problems as simply a source of employment and institu­
tion-building, that is one matter. But if we seriously want to improve 
conditions in the cities^ we must understand that the challenge requires 
much more than our traditional responses. The planner is very likely 
to want to address a problem only in terms of his own professional 
skills, and then to stop. He sketches his design, or performs his 
regression, or builds his simulation model; he identifies an apparent 
solution. He then represents it as lucidly and persuasively as he can 
to his client, the Planning commission —  and then he stops»
Gentlemen —r that is not enough if we seriously intend affect 
outcomes! Those who propose ends, and who care about outcomes must 
come to care about means. We must be prepared to spend some time and 
take some risks in improving city conditions and in moving toward 
greater equity - two points which come to almost the same thing.
Planners who are serious about their work must understand more clearly 
that both decision-making and implementation are processes, not acts, 
and that both require their protracted and energetic participation.
So our work is cut out for us. We must better understand our 
moral and technical responsibilities as planners within a system driven 
by powerful economic and ideological forces. We must learn to interact 
with political and other public officials on their terms and accept 
our share of responsibility and risk in the day-to-day decision process. 
If we work seriously and energetically within the context I have 
described, our profession may play a major role in resolving many of
22.
i
America s urban problems. But anything less than such a serious 
effort lays us open to the ultimate judgment —— "that we came and 
saw and passed by on the other side."
1 .
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Perk,  who  had  won  office  vowing  to  be  different  from  his  predecessor.  The  outcomes, 
Krumholz  notes,  were  approximately  similar.  Both  opposed    massive  highway  inspired 
clearances. Both supported a focus on the transit dependent constituencies. And the planners 
had more success with, and influence on, Perk: Stokes had needed to capture white votes, and 
hesitated  to  implement  the planners proposals. Perk needed  the black vote, and supported 
them. 
 








PLANNING UNDER MAYORS CARL B. STOKES (D) AND RALPH J. PERK (R)
A Seminar at the University of California, Berkeley
October 11, 1973 
By Norman Krumholz
A little more than two after 3% years in office as
À
Mayor of Cleveland, Carl B. Stokes announced he would not seek re- 
election.
Three pretenders to the throne eventually emerged —
—  a millionaire businessman and developer running on 
the Democratic ticket who stressed efficiency in 
government and Cleveland's need for unity under 
strong executive leadership;
—  a black candidate and president of the school board 
running as an independent who stressed efficiency in 
government and Cleveland's need for unity under 
strong executive leadership; and
—  the Republican County Auditor making his third run 
for the^Mayor's office who stressed that Carl Stokes 
was villain and that a vote for the other two 
candidates was a vote for Carl B. Stokes.
On November 2, 1971, 38% of the electorate voted against Carl B. 
Stokes and, in a 3-way race, this gave Ralph J. Perk a stunning and 
sizeable plurality. Six days later Mayor Perk was sworn into office 
and the City of Cleveland waited expectantly —  some waited in fear —  
for the drastic changes promised by the apparently drastic change in 
leadership.
Much of the difference in the two as perceived by Cleveland voters 
was an obvious difference in personalities. Stokes has an unfailing
2.
charisma, a cosmopolitan air; is flamboyant in his dress and manner, 
engaging and engrossing in his appearances. He has a national (even 
international) following, uses the electronic media well both locally 
and nationally.
Perk, on the other hand, is viewed as steady, honest and sincere 
—  a family man who attends church regularly. He wears $40 suits 
proudly (or wore them before he became Mayor) and pays for his own 
travel as Mayor (or occasionally says he does). He is less than note­
worthy before TV, but very much at home in church basements and in 
ethnic social clubs where he ate and talked for most of his adult life 
with those who voted for him in November 1971. He fixes his own oat­
meal for breakfast every day, lives in the same neighborhood where he 
was born. His wife bowls regularly, he sings with a local barbershop 
quartet. (As Mayor, Perk's wife is said to have turned down a dinner 
invitation to the White House, protesting that it was her bowling 
night. It is probable that her husband, the Mayor,was delighted.)
Differences between Stokes and Perk seem overwhelming —  and are 
usually emphasized by the news media —  but there are some important 
similarities. Both were born and raised in Cleveland —  Stokes in one 
of Cleveland's first public housing projects on the near east side, 
Perk in an ethnic working class neighborhood in south Cleveland. Both 
have felt the pressing indignity and discipline of poverty. Both 
eventually finished higher education with financial difficulty. Both 
sprang into political life with poor working class constituencies and 
both eventually were elected to offices by a much wider constituency.
3.
Both espouse a moral commitment to essentially the same constituency 
—  in Stokes' terms the "poor people," in Perk's terms the "little 
people."
But in the end, Stokes is black. Perk is not. When Stokes argues 
for attention to the needs of "poor people," voters hear him argue for 
black people. When Perk argues for attention to the needs of "little 
people," voters hear him argue for white people. This difference is 
fundamental and pervasive.
So, the differences between Stokes and Perk as individuals and 
as advocates were partly real, partly perceived; partly important, 
partly not. For the voters of Cleveland on November 2, 1971, the 
differences must have been real and important. We can safely assume 
that the significant minority of Clevelanders who voted for Perk 
wanted a drastic change in City Hall and that they felt Perk as Mayor 
would make those changes. This paper is a brief analysis of the 
possibility of such change as well as a comment on the difference the 
change from Stokes to Perk made to the effectiveness of the city 
planning staff.
You will recall that Perk's campaign was blantantly against Stokes 
(who wasn't even running) and only superficially for anything, it is 
difficult therefore, to speculate and impossible to know exactly what 
Perk's constituency wanted or expected. Aside from Perk's constant 
reminder that a vote for Pinkney or Carney (the other two candidates 
in the race) was a vote for Stokes, his campaign promises of importance 
weref >5"*,*
1. To join with other municipalities in the suburbs to 
cooperatively guide the destiny of the region.
4 .
2. ToJimprove services and|cut fargislon the Cleveland 
Transit System entirely out of fare-box revenues.
3. To balance the city's budget with no increase in taxes.
4. To stop the construction of public housing in areas 
where residents did not want it (i.e., in white and 
black middle class neighborhoods) and
5. To stop the decline of Cleveland's population and industry. 
These promises, inA*SÄ cases, represented a change from Stokes' 
policies. How did Mayor Perk succeed in implementing these changes?
Let me discuss them in turn.
City vs. Suburb—  Mayor Stokes wanted more influence in decisions
made by regional entities which affected the City. He asked for this
influence in decisions made by the ^ -county regional agency which
oversees most federal spending and A-95 reviews in the area. When his
proposal was rejected, he withdrew from the regional agency, refused
to pay the city's dues, and initiated a lawsuit calling for one man-
one vote representation on the agency's governing board.
Mayor Perk promised in his campaign to rejoin the regional agency,
pay the city's dues and terminate the lawsuit.
After Mayor Perk's inauguration he did precisely that, but not
before insisting on the same numerical representation on the Board as
did Stokes. Subsequent events are beginning to suggest that he w l M b 
bêyti'KiA*
tot» doming to see that the interests of the people of Cleveland —  
particularly the interests of the poor and lower-middle class population 
which predominates —  are rarely served by the rural - and suburban-
dominated Board of the 7-County regional agency.
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Admittedly, this view has been pressed upon Perk as it was upon 
Stokes by my staff and myself, and the Mayor's regional policy will 
wax and wane with his trust in us. But Mayor Perk has seen in the 
last two years how two highways —  one approved by the regional agency 
and one soon to be approved, would decimate ethnic areas of political 
interest to him. He has also seen how a $20 million law enforcement 
grant which he was instrumental in getting (and which he planned to 
use for his police department) will accrue largely to the courts, 
correctional institutions and the suburbs as it works its way through 
the regional sieve. He will come to see more threats to City interests 
from projects to be proposed by the regional agency in mass transpor­
tation, and water and sewer. I predict that before too much longer, 
he will be fighting the suburbs with much the same vigor and maybe 
the same methods that Mayor Stokes used.
Improve Service and cut fares on the Cleveland Transit System; In 
spite of much rhetoric focused on the 'incompg^ |^ |,, personnel of CTS - 
especially on the executive director who "makes more than the Governor 
of Ohio," Mayor Perk has been unable to reduce the annual deficit or 
improve service. Efforts at cost-cutting have broken over the rock 
of union contracts. Even the over-paid Executive Director remains by 
virtue of his long-term contract. So, in spite of his complete control 
of the CTS Board, and his predilections toward economy^Mayor Perk has 
been forced to lend the transit system $9.3 million to bail out its 
deficit for another year. When that money runs out, who knows? 
Ultimately, the city system must go to a regional agency and, at that
6.
time, the city Planning Commission will press upon perk (or his 
successor) as we did upon Stokes, the conditions for that transfer 
which will be of specific benefit to the transit-dependent people of 
Cleveland. /"8e, ^  " ‘T ? *  * 3  ^
A Balanced City Budget —  Mayor Stokes sought to resolve the fiscal 
crisis of the City in 1970 by asking voters for an increase in taxes.
Mayor Perk was vocal and adamant in his promise to the voters that 
he would balance the city's books without raising taxes —  by cutting 
costs.
Mayor Stokes argued throughout his second term in office that the 
City needed new revenues to maintain minimum service levels. In 
November of 1970, he asked for tax reform —  a reduction in property 
taxes and an increase in income taxes —  to raise new revenues. He 
got the reduction in property taxes but not the increase in the income 
tax, and was forced into a first round of lay-offs a year before Perk 
came into office. Because Mayor Stokes would permit no cuts in public 
safety forces (police and fire), City services in health, recreation 
and waste collection were seriously curtailed.
Mayor Perk argued in his campaign that service levels could be 
maintained (even improved) with even more reductions in cost; he prom­
ised no tax increase if elected. When he assumed office he found that 
the cuts by Stokes had already undermined services and that, with no 
new revenues to count on, the cost reductions needed would be drastic 
indeed. Most important, the public safety forces would have to assume 
some of the burden, for this department represents 70% of the general
budget.
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Further, the City ended 1971 with a deficit, varying between 
2.5 million and 27 million depending upon your political persuasion, 
which would have to be paid off the top in 1972. (Perk's story about 
accountants.)
In short, Perk's promise not to increase taxes led him to proposals 
for severe cost reductions and these reductions could only be made with 
massive lay-offs. He began some lay-offs in December of 1971.
Though the Mayor knew he must reduce the costs of police and fire, 
he did not want to lay off these, to him, crucial city employees. He 
privately proposed a compromise —  that all police and firemen remain 
on the job full-time, accept 90% of their legal wages now and 10% at 
some future date when the City got the money. The police and fire 
unions refused.
The Mayor, stung by the police and fire refusal, then proposed 
that all City employees —  police and fire included —  work only nine 
out of every ten days and receive only 90% of their current pay. The 
alternative, he threatened, was substantial lay-off of city workers, 
again, including police and fire.
The Fraternal Order of Police then sought, and obtained from the 
lower courts, an order prohibiting the Mayor from implementing this 
proposal insofar as the police and firemen are concerned. Mayor Perk 
appealed this order and got a temporary order from a higher court 
saying that his plan could be put into effect on an interim basis.
In the meantime, other City unions indicated that they would 
reluctantly accept a proposal similar to that originally offered to 
the public safety forces —  to work full time at 90% pay if the remain-
8 .
ing 10% is eventually paid. Some individual police and firemen indicated 
they would also prefer such a plan.
But the union leadership and higher echelons of the police and fire 
remained adamantly opposed to lay-offs, reductions in pay and work, or 
deferred payments. They cited the usual crime statistics and made the 
standard comparisons to show that the City cannot reduce its efforts in 
any way in this society's struggle against crime. At the same time 
these leaders refused to commit themselves in support of any measure 
to increase revenues through tax increases.
In short, by mid-1972 Mayor Perk had come to the realization that 
he could not reduce costs as much as he needed to (costs were to be 
deferred, not reduced), that new revenues would have to be required, 
and that his resolution of the fiscal crisis would not vary signifi­
cantly from the resolution Mayor Stokes was heading for —  costs would 
be cut somewhat and new revenues will have to be found in tax increases.
Ih fdc Mtdtr of Ityl*
Enter General Revenue Sharing.and the Swift resolution of last year's
OvJ’ rev«*•*•» ^ j - JLfiscal crisis,* New wage negotiations open in Jan. 1971j lté.
>V* fLjlt ofi II \ »M mi .
With regard to the Planning Commission's contribution, it is note- n*ht
worthy that neither Mayor held any abiding interest in efficiency of 
City government operations. Mayor Stokes, in his appeals for new 
revenues was not interested in management studies which we urged upon 
him promising ways in which the City could do more with what it had.
In the same way, Mayor Perk's cost-cutting is absolutely without dis­
crimination —  a straight 10% cut across the board with no attention 
nor preference given to priorities or affect on services. We continue
9.
to labor in this particular vineyard, proposing that "productivity" 
be entered into next year's wage discussions. *0« H tt
Qt*t&**/\f Crifèt M a*  ^
Low Income Public Housing —  Mayor Stokes wanted low-income public
housing in every neighborhood in the City and in the suburbs as well.
Mayor Perk has said he will fight the location of public housing 
in any area where the residents do not want it. He appears to include 
the suburbs in this, as he halted work by the planning staff on a new 
town because suburban neighbors were opposed to low-income residents 
in the proposal.
Mayor Perk revoked the building permits for two previously-approved 
public housing projects in white areas of the City immediately upon 
assuming office. In both cases, fulfillment of his campaign pledge 
subjected him to court action. in both cases, court action was requested 
by the local public housing authority and the courts decision was against 
him. Quietly, the revoked building permits were re-issued and construc­
tion is now complete.
Though Mayor Perk, by this action, did please his constituency 
immensely, he has at the same time posed himself another dilemma. On 
the one hand, he threatens to fight any public housing located in white 
areas. On the other hand, he is the chief executive officer of a City 
which has a contractual agreement with the local public housing authority 
to build or buy and operate public housing units in all parts of the City. 
When the federal spigot is opened again in support of public housing,
I presume that the Housing Authority will bring suit against the City 
for breach of contract. The courts, then, may determine the future of 
public housing in Cleveland - at least in the short term.
Cd*cJus*{
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—  Despite different styles of two Mayors, outcomes were^similar.
Institutions and bureaucracies, civil service, unions, the FOP 
tend to control on relatively minor matters. On large matters 
such as city decline, larger economic and social forces control. 
Therefore, the Mayor has few critical options open to him, 
whoever he is. (C;k Ckn. siJf)
—  What did the changing of the guard mean to the operations and 
effectiveness of CPC staff?
Expected to be fired or at least cut back in budget. Did not 
occur. . .
/ft d e p i w
— ^ Lost abilityrto address the rest of the nation as well as the
j A -
City and region on matters CPC staff considered vital —  
greater equity, re-adjusted national priorities redistribution 
of wealth and power. Wrote speeches, articles, Law Review 
paper. Congressional testimony, U. s. Civil Rights Comm, testi­




-- ^  But gained receptive audience on equity-based programs, i.e.
New Health Center at Miles Ave. $1.5 demolition allocation;
improved funding for rat-control and neighborhood clean-up
ft)r fix btjfiy so/iff tourt bttu'/ors Z /y
campaigns. Also support for housing allowance proposals, ^
where Stokes was more supportive of supply-side subsidies.
—  Both Mayors gave planning staff great support on highway and 
transit policies. A u k  /0f
Syyt Cor cf/âb A /#***
On net, we appear
(u j  to&t r *coe*s/>d
to be more influential„with Perk than
A
Stokes. Why?
a) Perk less concerned with "professionalism" in appoint­
ments. Good for local politics but needs dimension of 
expertise,^ analysis and understanding of regional and 
federal bureaucracies.
11.
b) Stokes needed 20% white vote; perk needs to neutralize 
black vote and is therefore somewhat more receptive to 
"black" programs.
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  Reviews the evidence and  literature of claims regional authorities will  lead to better service 
and reduced costs. Finds they do not; and democracy suffers as well, with less voter turnout.  
Krumholz  calls  the  Cleveland  area  version,  the  Northeast  Ohio  Area  Coordinating  Agency 
(NOACA)  “the  bastard  offspring  of  a  loveless  dalliance  between  dreamers  and  cynics”:  its 
history  of  conflict,  first  over  the  unwillingness  of  rural  and  suburban  counties  to  tolerate 
proportional representation to the central cities of the region, then over highway proposals 
that  would  raze  1700  Cleveland  residence  and  cost  the  city  $25  million  in  lost  property 
assessments,  resulted  in  the  federal  government  decertifying  the  agency.    Krumholz 
concludes: “To really do something new  in governmental reform requires some critical mass 
of people who perceive  themselves  as  chronic  losers under  the present  rules of  the  game. 
Lacking this, there is no logic strong enough 
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James Thurber, in one of his most delightful stories, writes of iiis 
great aunt who, in the years following the discovery of electricity, 
would go around the house stuffing bits of paper into the electrical out-
1 • 1 VT. ‘lets. It seems she was possessed of the unshakable notion that this was 
the only way to keep electricity from dripping onto the carpet.
Whenever I leave the pressure cooker at Cleveland City Hall,and 
address myself to such cosmic subjects as "city, Suburbs and Regionalism" 
I often get the feeling that I, like Thurber's great aunt, don't tinder- 
stand what's going on. Nobody else seems to see the stuff and nonsense 
dripping onto the regional carpet.
"Regionälism," whether one means some form of metropolitan govern-
• 1- si; " , iment or merely an arrangement for metropolitan planning and cooperation,
conj-iifes up such righteous connotations, such visions of piety, that one
feels inhibited from discussing it with anything but reverent approval.
*
In fact, my views on regionalism are less than reverent-, less than en­
thusiastic and less than optimistic. And I must say that my four years
oh the Board of the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency (NOACA), 
our regional planning body, has done little to temper my opinion.
Let me elaborate on this jaundiced view by dealing first with what 
the literature seems to be saying about the performance of various metro-
i
politan governing arrangements including those which are permanent like 
Nashville-Davidson County and those which are cooperative like the Lake- 
wood Plan in Los Angeles. I'll turn to our local situation later on.
Regional governmental arrangements are reform movements. They are 
designed to respond to the problems of political fragmentation in our 
metropolitan areas.
These problems include the proliferation of local and special-purpose 
governments with similar or overlapping responsibilities. These multi­
tudinous governmental entities are alleged to be major obstacles to 
orderly administration and planned development. In Greater Cleveland, 
for example, there are some 105 separate governmental units each possess­
ing independent taxing prerogatives and varying degrees of regulatory 
power. It is said that this leads to overlapping service responsibilities, 
rising taxes, lack of centralized political control, uneven and gross
■ > ,
aspects of regional growth,- fiscal disparities in the region, and the 
general decline of the central city. All these problems, it is said, 
can be resolved and rationalized by political and administrative reform.
‘ IrLi.’CJ“
3Simply stated, the main goals sought through metropolitan govern­
mental reform are economy and efficiency which are said to accrue as 
a result of centralized control and economies of scale, an improved level 
of public service —  both soft and hard, professionalization of govern-
I
mental decision-making, weakening of "parochialism" among area-wide 
policy-makers and maintenance of open access by all the citizens of the




What has been the record of various metropolitan governmental arrange­
ments in meeting this set of goals? I have not read too widely in the *
field, but my admittedly limited analysis leads me to the following
*
general conclusions:
i. Economy and Efficiency: ,
There is little evidence that economies of scale in public
services are being realized across the board in many re- ;
formed metropolitan institutions. Such economies of scale
as are realized, appear only in hard services like electricity,
—  water and sewerage, and are lost in such soft services as
police protection. In general, moreover, the taxes which
support these reformed metropolitan entities do not go down,
they qo up. Some of the literature does sugqest that whenT ” /' * C
services are transferred from a local to an areawide basis, 
levels of service tend to rise on the average. On that 
basis, it might be inferred that higher costs are justified 
since they are buying an improved level of service.
But in some of the cases where service levels rise for the
-region as a whole, there is a question as to the incidence
of these.improvements. Does everyone get the goodies
equally? If not, who does? „o
Daniel Grant's work on the experience in Nashville-Davidson
Co. presents evidence of an equalization of services. But
the equalization of services means improved services for k
»■the suburbs, not for the City. Grant makes no claim that 
City services were improved at all.
Similarly, the accomplishments of Toronto Metro, as detailed 
by Harold Kaplan, are almost exclusively in the form of im­
proved hard services for outlying areas, rather than im­
proved City services or solutions to the social problems of
«
particular concern to the central city.
The economist, Werner Hirsch who has done extensive work on* * < • : •
quantification of units of service, seems to best sum.up the
♦
question of the relationship of service area size to potential 
economies of scale. Hirsch points out that, for private goods, 
increasing the size of the population tends to be associated
with declining unit costs, but this is not necessarily so for
. . . .  , /
public goods. Hirsch concludes that there are some economies 
of scale which result from decreasing unit costs in such 
routine items as water and sewerage, as well as from bulk 
purchasing of supplies and equipment. But, says Hirsch, 
these savings are often outweighed by the cost of top-heavy
5administration in the more labor-intensive services. Hirsch 
concludes that on balance, governmental size is not correlated 
with efficiency or economy. He concludes that governments 
- serving from 50,000 to 100,000 urbanites might be more effi­
cient than larger governmental units.
X
2. Professional Administration:
In almost all studies I have seen, the increased influence 
of professionals does appear throughout the entire range of 
reforms. Typically, regardless of whether permanent or
t
cooperative regional units are under analysis, policy-making 
members of the executive board devote little of their time 
to "homework" between meetings, and leave the technical
I
experts to run the various divisions. The impact of pro-
-  * . 4
féssionals appears to be greatest in "hard" service areasï 
capital projects, tangible and physically-oriented rather 
than "softer" socially-oriented functions. Although not ^ 4
much on homework, policy makers, are active in determining, 
the jurisdictional distribution of projects and programs. .
In this sense, they yield to the expertise of the profession-
© als in agenda-setting and in project development, but they ci.
make sure that some kind of parity among participating bodies
exists in sharing the goodies.
. /  4  .3. Weakening of "parochialism" among areawide policy-makers:
Very little of this seems to be happening. Representatives
to areawide decision-making bodies apparently see themselves
. . a. :
as delegates of their municipalities to the regional body:
, > 
they are municipal officers first, and metro councillors
second. As Joan Aron makes clear in her 1969 study of the
t
' N.Y. Metropolitan Regional Council, the members tend to
examine proposals in terms of costs and benefits to their
own communities. This is not surprising since in most major
governmental reform structures, representatives are elected
on a district basis with most municipalities retaining their
independent ,legal status. This structure contains a host of 
• <
incentives which favor the delegate outlook. Although they 
perceive themselves as delegates from their own districts, 
participants do feel that metropolitan governmental institu­
tions provide a forum for sharing state and regional infor-
f mation and relating to state and federal governments.
«
4. Citizen Interest and Participation:
f  5 Apparently reformed regional agencies dampen voter interest.
And the quality of performance of regional institutions -- 
one way or the other —  has little effect on citizen interest *** 
or participation. A Nashville study indicates that increased 
citizen interest in Metro .is related to educational achieve­
ment, and that interest decreases with the depth of rural 
attachment. This is exactly what might have been expected —
simply a confirmation of existing patterns of participation 
in local government.
7Voter participation actually seems to decline with the advent 
of reform. The voters in Toronto Metro and Miami seem to be
directing their interest toward their own municipal govern- 
- ments, or neighborhood arrangements, not Metro, where per­
centages voting in elections has declined.
Another interesting aspect of citizen participation in reform 
movements is the often-heard cry that metropolitan government 
has the effect of blunting the increasing black influence Jin 
the political affairs of the core city. In fact, this seems
î
to be the case, although research on the issue is limited.
/
Observers in Nashville and Miami indicate that black influence 
has not decreased under reform, but they are not prepared to
argue that, in the absence of metro, black influence would „> 
not have been greater in the core city. Clearly, however, 
according to Bollens and Schmandt, black political leaders 
and minority voters in reformed areas feel that their service 
levels have declined and that their power and influence-have 
suffered dilution. And perhaps the perception in this case
Given this brief run-down, how are we to answer the question: Have
regional governmental reform units worked? The answer is ambiguous.
They have clearly not achieved the aspirations of their staunchest pro­
ponents. They have not reduced taxes, they have not realized any signi­
ficant economies of scale in services across the board. They have dealt 
almost exclusively with "hard" rather than "soft" services. They appear
is the same thing
\
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not to'have altered the structure of local political power, mitigated 
parochialism or inspired their citizens to great interest and vigorous 
participation. Their "successes" seem mainly to exist in the field of 
proféssionalizing some aspects of regional decision-making, in providing 
a regional focum for political dialogue and information interchange, and 
in providing another governmental level between component localities and 
the state and federal governments. They have, in fact, not done much, 
which is new. Not much of a track record, if I read the literature > 
correctly.
Let me now turn to the Cleveland scene where I propose to briefly 
examine the short, unhappy life of NÛACA, the Northeast Ohio Areawide 
Coordinating Agency. NOACA, formed in early 1968, is an example of 
a metropolitan organization established solely to satisfy federal require-
»
ments for areawide review and planning of federal grant applications. The 
region served by NOACA is comprised of 7 counties whose populations range 
in size from 1.7 million to 63,000. Two of the counties are almost en-
Uitf. 2 e n ­tirely urbanized, two are suffering the swift growth pangs of suburbia,
and the other three may be classified as rural. The region's black popu-
/lation is heavily centralized in its two core cities, Cleveland and Akron,
and its concentrations of poverty are similarly distributed.^ 75% of all'I
families with incomes over $15,000 live in the suburbs, 75% of all people 
on welfare live in ClevelandAbout 1/3 of all suburban families have
*i . . . • • •'
2 or more cars; 1/3 of the households in Cleveland have no car; Cleveland
. . _ ",
has 12,000 public housing units, its suburbs have none. It is this region
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which was presumed by its federal architects to have a deep commonality 
f interest. Obviously* it is not sol In fact* NOACA represents^bhe
T  - *
bastard offspring of a loveless dalliance between dreamers and cynics, 
with no general government willing to proclaim any pride in paternity, 
^he suburbs opposed its formation, fearful of loss of home rule and 
domination by the Central City, and Cleveland opposed the agency as 
another governmental level which might get between the City and the 
federal government on whom the City, depends heavily for help. The Cif;y 
also feared —  with some justice — that its vital interests would be 
given over to those who felt no responsibility to its people. Nonethe­
less with heavy federal inducements acting as a shot-gun, the marriage 
was made.
NOACA*s first four years were marked with bitter controversy -- 
originally over representation on the Board and, then at the end of 1969, 
over the Board's approval of a controversial highway project through 
Cleveland, which in the judgment of Cleveland representatives, imposed 
grossly unacceptable costs upon the City of Cleveland. The conflict was 
resolved in 1972 with adjustments to the City's representation on the 
NOACA Board and the rescinding of the controversial highway proposal.
-.The^Board is an executive body whose si^e was originally set at 43,,
grew to 49 in 1969 and then to 58 in 1972. It consists of members of the 
6oai rds.of each of the*7 c<county ounties, plus some members appointed by
the Mayor of Akron, the Mayor of Cleveland, the City Council of Cleveland,
r ». , * *’
Stofes u b *
the Cleveland Transit System^and the Cuyahoga County Mayors and Managers 
Association. Some executive) k ï À j !  ( H ù h  th & s  "M t e /fS c & 'S )
{ L  / > M t -  > '* f a r e tf  f i t * ! ^
But the highway dispute is even more interesting than the Board.
The dispute which ostensibly centered on Interstate 290, exposed a series 
of issues which in Cleveland and elsewhere make up the crux of America's 
urban dilemma and outline the depth of the gulf separating central city 
from suburbs. These are not the issues of efficiency, economy, and
t
_ • > 
management with which most regional agencies of all types busy themselves,
but the deeper, more controversial problems of neighborhood preservation,
declining tax base, race, housing and fiscal disparities among growing and
declining jurisdictions.
The 1-290 controversy in Cleveland laid open many of these issues.
The -highway, if built, along the NOACA-approved right-of-way, would have
displaced 1700 City of Cleveland households (many of whom were low-income
families), disrupted two of the most stable neighborhoods on Cleveland's
«
east side, taken about $25 million in property valuations off Cleveland's
tax duplicate and cost the City about $7 million directly as its local
share of project cost. The rationale used to justify NOACA's decision
was the alleged need for 1-290 as part, of the regional interstate highway
network. It was even argued at NOACA that the members of the Board must
turn their faces from parochialism and, like regional statesmen, think
*of the best interests of the entire region. Most Board members were able 
to rise to the occasion over the voficerous objections of the city. In
response, the City's representatives asked the regional statesmen to help
JU
x ± .
resettle the displacees by building publie housing in their jurisdictions, 
vy sharing in Cleveland's share of highway construction costs and by making 
annual payments to Cleveland to make up for the losses to its tax base.
It is too painful for me to record the reaction. Of course, none of this . 
was seriously discussed.
• ‘ . • \
It was this issue which sparked two years of bitter conflict between
I
City and Agency and led to the de-certification of NOACA by HUD. And it
*■ »
was not until the City and NOACA reached an accommodation on 1-290 that 
things settled down to their present state —  one in which we all quietly 
and”automatically approve each other's requests for grants-in-aid, and 
try to stay out of trouble.
•: ' • ■ j
None of this should be seen as reflecting badly on the quality of 1 *
the NOACA staff —  it. seems well led and considerably more competent
professionally than that of many similar agencies. But the Agency suffers* * 4
from a basic problem inherent in regional planning bodies — it lacks the 
power to implement anything at all, and its proposals must be reflective... «PT— -    TT*
of its political environment —  if it rocks the boat it may be in deep 
trouble. Indicative of the concern for the local political culture is 
the slogan of the National Association,of Regional Councils, "Regionalism 
is Local Power." That's almost as good as "Fat is Thin." What I take ^
this to mean is everything will be as before —  we will all continue to 
enjoy our communities of limited liability, only now we will satisfy the. 
federal guidelines. - ’
. »
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.Perhaps this is not too surprising. After all, it is the "soft“ 
social issues which vex our whole society, and simply altering a few 
governmental institutions means dealing with the wrong end of thé 
causal chain. The institutions, and patterns of behavior associated
j
with them, are consequences of more basic attitudes and social patterns. 
The value system, or the distribution of power and wealth, determines; 
the impact of institutional manipulation; simply changing governmental 
structures cannot alter these basic elements. In that context, perhaps 
it is not too surprising that metropolitan institutional reform has 
actually changed very little.
But then, despite the wailing of the reformers, academicians and 
professional bureaucrats like myself, it is an observable fact that most 
people are not interested in changing the present governmental game; the 
familiar present is often preferred to some alleged future good. Most 
of the time people will settle for a new deck or perhaps simply a new 
shuffle of the cards. ;
* » f
■ * •
To really do something new in governmental reform requires some 
critical mass of people who perceive themselves as chronic losers under 
the present rules of the game. Lacking this, there is no logic strong 
enough to bring about anything but a surface and illusory tinkering 
with the machinery. i ,,






  Here  two  Cleveland  planners  describe  the  discrepancies  between  the  rational  planning 
process  as  devised  for  capital  improvement  budgeting,  and  bargaining  that  actually  takes 
place among city council and city departments  in Cleveland.   In response, they devised ways 
to  involve themselves  in the real decision process,  introducing a measure of rationality after 
all. They gave staff support to one department resulting in the discovery of bonding authority 















The Capital Improvement 
Programming in Process in Cleveland:
Myth and Reality
by Janice Cogger and Norman Krumholz 
for ASPO Conference, 1975, Vancouver
Section 76-2 of the City of Cleveland's Charter directs the 
City Planning Commission to annually prepare a capital budget and 
capital improvements program. In discharging this responsibility 
the Commission supposedly obtainsfdetailed project requests from 
the operating departments, reviews these requests in light of re­
source estimates prepared by the Finance Department and the types
of land use and development considerations embodied in the General
V.Plan, conducts public hearings, formulates priorities, and recommends 
a one-year budget and five-year program to the Mayor. The recom­
mended Capital Improvements Program (CIP) then provides the founda­
tion for the Mayor's submission of a capital budget to City Council
land, ultimately, for the allocation of the City's capital resources.| 
At least this is the way Cleveland's capital improvements programming 
process has been described in the Manual of Sucrcrested Practice for 
the Preparation and Adoption of Capital Programs and Capital Budgets 
by Local Governments.-^ Judging from this description, one would 
think that capital improvements programming was an integral part of 
the decision making process, and that it provided the City Planning
1/ Prepared for the Municipal Finance Officers Association by Lennox L. 
Moak and Kathryn W. Killian, Chicago, 1964.
Commission with a powerful tool with which to influence the alloca­
tion of the City's capital resources.
However, shortly after my arrival in Cleveland I discovered 
an enormous gap between this "myth" and reality. The fact that the 
CIP consistently recommended a capital program which exceeded even 
the wildest estimates of the City's financing capabilities by 
several tens-of-millions of dollars provided an initial indication 
of the gap. Indeed, the CIP was almost universally known as the 
"City's wish book."
My worst suspicions were confirmed whèn I asked a staff member 
to describe the capital programming process. He launched into a 
detailed description of the steps involved in printing the book. 
Primary emphasis had clearly been placed upon the development of 
the CIP as a glossy publication rather than as a part of the de­
cision making process.
I initially assumed that the gap between theory and reality 
was attributable to a lack of expertize and initiative on the part 
of the planning staff. New staff members were assigned to redesign 
the process.
We found that efforts to work with the operating departments 
were complicated by their lack of analytical ability and the crisis , 
environment in which they functioned. Most departments found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of individual projects in 
terms of service objectives. Many of the projects which they pro-
2
posed seemed to be more a product of historical accident than any 
assessment of needs. The information which they gave about the 
projects was extremely sketchy and of questionable realiability.
In fact, departments regularly prepared their capital improvement 
requests by taking the prior year's CIP. crossing out those rela­
tively few projects which had been financed, and moving the cost 
figures for all other projects ahead one year.
The Finance Department's ability to play its appointed role in 
the process was equally limited. The City's financing and account­
ing procedures provide little foundation for the analysis of past, 
or design of future, investment policies. Bond accounts are main­
tained on a cash basis. Until very recently, the Division of 
Accounts had been generally two or more years behind in posting 
entries on bond accounts. Therefore, it is impossible even to de­
termine the total capital funds available at any given point in time.
The Mayor did not propose and City Council did not adopt a 
capital budget. The approval of a single project required the 
introduction and passage of several pieces of legislation. What 
had been called the City's "capital budget" was a document prepared 
at year's end indicating projects which had received some type of 
approval during the preceeding year. At the time we began our ef­
forts in 1969, two years had lapsed since thé publication of the 
last so-call capital budget.
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We concluded that a great deal of work would be required to 
move from the current reality toward the rational process described 
in the Manual. However, we continued to assume that both the Finance 
and operating departments could be convinced of the potential value 
of capital programming and, with technical assistance from our staff, 
could be helped to do a creditable job.
This was also found to be a myth. It was not that the City's 
administrators had never heard of the rationale for capital pro­
gramming, Rather, the City's elected officials and department heads 
had found that their interests were better served by the political 
process than by the planning process.
Cleveland's City Council is composed of thirty-three council- 
persons elected by ward for two-year terms. Since certain capital 
improvements have a high degree of public visibility, councilpersons 
have a considerable stake in the allocation of the City's capital 
resources. They are willing to trade votes on a wide range of 
issues for the construction of a recreation center or fire station, 
the rehabilitation of a playground or health center, the paving of 
several streets, or the provision of sewer improvements in their 
wards.
City departments are in constant search of the resources re­
quired to meet emergency capital needs, to maintain existing capital,
to replace deteriorating and obsolete capital and to provide for pro­
gram expansion.
Finally, both the Mayor and Council are frequently confronted 
by requests for City investments in support of private development 
efforts. Such requests may involve the provision of site improve­
ments or the concentration of City capital in areas surrounding the 
proposed development. The areas are not necessarily those scheduled 
for urban renewal, and the improvements are not necessarily those 
of highest priority from a City-wide perspective but they must be 
given consideration.
Therefore, the allocation of Cleveland's scarce capital re­
sources involves the Mayor and his Finance staff in a continuous 
bargaining process. Within this context, decision makers are un­
willing to commit themselves even months, to say nothing of years, 
in advance to a detailed investment program.
It might be argued that Cleveland's ward system makes the 
City's situation if not unique, at least extreme. I doubt it. The 
Cleveland School Board is composed of seven members elected at 
large. Yet, when the Board's capital program began to generate 
public interest, when questions were raised regarding the Board's 
investment policies, the practice of preparing a capital program 
was dropped.
So long as capital programming is conceived as a step-by-step 
process resulting in the preparation of a long-range plan, it will 
have little impact in the City of Cleveland. Decisions on the al­
location of capital are political decisions not technical decisions.
The establishment of investment priorities is a function of the 
political process, not the planning process. Therefore, decision 
makers and administrators have few incentives to cooperate in the 
formulation of the Planning Commission's Capital Improvements Program. 
In fact, their interests have been well served by discrediting it, 
lest it be used to discredit them —  hence the popular "wish book" 
title.
Does this mean that planners should abandon all efforts to 
influence the allocation of the City's capital resources? We think 
not. Recognizing that we have little chance of changing reality to 
fit our old models of planning practice (and, I should add, little 
desire to do so), we have attempted to change our method of operation 
to fit the reality of decision making.
We continue to publish an annual Capital Improvements Program 
because we are legally obligated to do so. But, we have substantially 
reduced the money and staff time devoted to it. More importantly, 
we have changed the image of the document by dropping all pretext 
of its being a plan. Emphasis is placed upon the discussion of in­
vestment issues rather than on the programming of individual projects. 
We have used the CIP as a way of drawing attention to the fact that 
the City regularly constructs facilities which it cannot afford to 
operate or maintain. Similarly, we have shown that by deferring 
investment in less visible types of projects (such as bridge repairs)
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the City is gradually consuming its capital stock. Individual pro­
jects are presented in "shopping list" fashion as a kind of appendix 
to such issues analyses.
However, our efforts to influence investment decisions are not 
confined to, nor principally oriented toward, the preparation of the 
CIP. They generally take two forms; (1) providing operating de­
partments with staff assistance in analyzing their capital needs and 
finding means to finance priority projects? and (2) active involve­
ment in the highly political process by which individual projects 
are financed or tabled.
Staff work with the Division of Waste Collection and Disposal 
provides an example of the former. Based largely on a recommenda­
tion made by the Planning Commission in 1971, a Federal grant was 
secured for the study of waste collection and disposal procedures.
As a result of considerable analysis and lengthy negotiations, the 
number of waste collection routes has been reduced by over 50%, a 
bulk-item pick up program initiated, a major capital improvement 
program undertaken, a detailed capital replacement scheduled 
formulated, and proposals for changes in disposal procedures sent 
on their way through the legislative process. For over two years 
a member of the Planning staff was assigned full time to work with 
the Commissioner of Solid Waste, the consultant, and City Council on 
this project. His initial contribution to the effort was the
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"discovery" of $6 million in voted bond authority. In order not 
to risk an increase in the property tax rate, the prior administra­
tion had decided not to issue waste collection and disposal bonds 
approved by the voters in 1967. With a change in administration 
and department personnel, the existence of the bond authority had 
apparently been forgotten. While studying old capital fund records, 
our man re-discovered it. With only a matter of weeks left before 
the authority was to lapse, he mustered the support needed to have 
the bonds sold. This insured the availability of the capital funds 
needed to carry out the Division's program, and firmly established 
his position as a key actor in the Division's planning process.
An example of the Planning Commission's involvement in the con­
troversy surrounding individual projects is provided by the "Tower 
City debate." In the spring of 1974, a local developer sought City 
Council approval of legislation committing the City to an open-ended 
investment in the repair of bridges surrounding the site of a pro­
posed office-commercial complex. While the developer estimated the 
cost to the City at $2-3 million, independent engineering studies 
had indicated that the price tag might be $15 million or more. In 
attempting to determine the probable benefits to the City from such 
an investment, the Commission concluded that the project offered no 
guarantee of additional property or income tax revenues to the City, 
no commitment of jobs for the unemployed, and in fact, might only 
add to the surplus of office space in downtown. Based upon the
knowledge that the bridges under consideration constitute no 
hazard to public safety while other bridges in the City do, and 
based upon a policy aimed at insuring that the City and its resi­
dents receive a reasonable return from investment in downtown re­
development efforts, the Commission disapproved the legislation. 
Though the Commission's disapproval was overridden by City Council, 
the issue has not yet been resolved. At very least, the Commission 
succeeded in raising several important questions which provide the 
basis for current negotiations and will certainly arise again in 
regard to similar investment proposals.
Our experience in Cleveland indicates that we can have far 
greater impact upon the allocation of the City's capital resources 
by involving ourselves in the process by which investment decisions 
are actually made, than by involving ourselves in the preparation 
of a capital improvement program. Perhaps in some cities the two 
processes can be made synonymous; in Cleveland they cannot.
The description of the capital programming provided in the 
Manual —  reflects a certain type of rationality. It assumes that 
each step in the process can be specified, ordered, and assigned a 
time frame. It assumes that the actors in the process are always 
the same and that they can be assigned specific roles. The decision 
making process embodies a different type of rationality —  political 
rationality.
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For decades planners have attempted to mold reality to their 
ideal of rationality. In Cleveland we have discovered that to 
influence decisions we are the ones who must adapt. We have found 
that the decision making process in continuous, that it follows no 
rigid pattern, and that power is dispersed. Abandoning the ideal 
of planning rationality, we seize opportunities to influence de­
cisions whenever they arise; we seek to identify the key actors on 
any given issue and to influence their positions; we enlist the 
support of all interested in the allocation of public resources.
The outcomes we seek arapot defined by a General Plan, but by the 
goal and objectives of the Planning Commission.
If I werdtfiere today to discuss other, traditional tools of the 
planning process, the examples I might cite would be different but 
my conclusion would be substantially the same. In a session later 
today on planning education, I will discuss the need for planners 
to re-evaluate the issues to which they address themselves, to 
abandon long-standing professional biases, and to respond to the 
serious economic and social problems confronting our cities and 
their residents. There is a parallel need for planners to recon­
sider the methods which they employ, to abandon those which are 
merely a reflection of some abstract planning ideal, and to develop 
new methods more suited to the world in which we function.
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